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The Legislative Council, which is composed of five Senators, 
six Representatives, and the presiding officers of the two 
houses, serves as a continuing research agency for the legisla-
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relatively broad problems formally proposed by legislators, and 
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their solution. 
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them with information needed to handle their own legislative 
problems. Reports and memoranda both give pertinent data in the 
form of facts, figures, arguments, and alternatives. 
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To Members of the Forty-sixth Colorado General Assembly: 
In accordance with the directives of House Joint 
Resolution No. 1024, 1965 regular session, the Legislative 
Council submits the accompanying report and recommenda-
tions prepared by its Committee on Tax Exempt PropertI 
concerning clarifications or changes in the constitut on 
and statutes relating to property tax exemptions. 
The report and recommendations of the committee ap-
pointed to carry out the study were approved by the Council 
at its meeting on November 28, 1966, for transmission to 
the members of the Forty-sixth General Assembly. 
FO/mp 
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November 29, 1966 
Senator Floyd Oliver, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
Room 341, State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Rep, Mark A.. Ho~n 
Rep, John R. P. Wheeler 
Your committee appointed to carry out the studies 
requested by House Joint Resolution No. 1024. 1965 regu-
lar session, relating to tax exempt properties, submits 
herewith its final report and recommendations. 
House Joint Resolution No. 1024, 1965 regular ses-
sion, specifically directed the committee to review 
possible clarification or changes in the constitution and 
statutes relating to tax exempt propertys. needed improve-
ment in the administration of the statutes; and revision 
of the system of keeping public records on exemptions 
heretofore granted, as well as current exemptions. The 
committee devoted this time to a review of exemptions on 




/s/ Senator Ruth Stockton 




Pursuant to the directives of House Joint Resolution No. 
1024, 1965 regular session, the Legislative Council appointed the 
following committee to conduct the study of tax exempt property 
in Colorado: 
Sen. Ruth Stockton, Chairman 
Rep. Harold Adcock, Vice Chairman 
Sen. John Bermingham 
Sen. Fay DeBerard 
Rep. Joseph V. Calabrese 
Rep. James LaHaye 
Rep. Hiram A. McNeil 
Rep. Robert Schafer 
The resolution specifically directed the committee to re-
view possible clarification or changes in the constitution and 
statutes relating to tax exempt property; needed improvement in 
the administration of the statutes; and revision of the system of 
keeping public records on exemptions heretofore granted, as well 
as current exemptions. The committee established two phases for 
the study. The first phase, the 1965 interim study, was devoted 
to a review of the constitutional exemption granted to publicly 
owned property. The second phase, the 1966 interim study, was de-
voted to a review of statutory exemptions and private educational, 
religious, and charitable properties. 
Assisting the committee in the study were Mr. Jim Wilson of 
the Legislative Reference Office, members of the Colorado Tax 
Commission, and Mr. Dave Morrissey of the Council staff. 
November 29, 1966 
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Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since 1963 the Legislative Council Committee on Tax Exempt 
Property has wrestled with the problems of tax exemptions for 
various classes of property. In order to focus on the impact of 
exP.mptions, the committee requested the Council staff to develop an 
inventory of property exemptions in Colorado. Early in this study 
it became apparent that records of county assessors with respect to 
exempt properties were woefully inadequate, and the Tax Commission 
now is in the process of updating the tax exempt records of the 
county assessors. 
A preliminary estimate of the value of tax exempt property 
in Colorado was completed by the Council staff in December of 1964. 
This estimate reveals that the major portion of tax exempt proper-
ties are under federal, state, and municipal ownership. The 
minin,um estimated assessed value of federal, state, and municipal 
properties approximates $533,000,000 or 65.3 per cent of all tax 
exempt property in Colorado. (This figure does not include facili-
ties for higher education which were reported separately.) Because 
of the relatively large amount of public exempt property, the 
cornmi:i.ttee concentrated its efforts in this area in 1965. 
Public Property 
Since the Constitution of the state was adopted, it has 
contained a provision exempting public property from ad valorem 
taxes (Article X, Section 4). According to the decisions of the 
Colorado Supreme Court, Article X, Section 4, means that all prop-
erties of the state, cities and towns, counties, public libraries, 
and other municipal corporations are exempt from ad valorem taxes 
regardless of ttuse"; "ownership" is the only criterion for granting 
an ad valorem exemption for public property.! Furthermore, in 
1961 the General Assembly made an unsuccessful attempt to minimize 
the impact of the state's acquisition of private taxable lands by 
requiring the payment of fees in lieu of taxes on lands removed 
from the tax rolls by the purchases of the Game, Fish, and Parks 
Department. The Colorado Supreme Court declared this act unconsti-
tutional -- Game and Fish Commission of Colorado v. Cleland N. 
Feast, et al (1965), No. 20489. Thus a constitutional amendment is 
needed if the General Assembly is to exercise discretion with re-
spect to tax exemptions on public property. 
The acquisition of large tracts of taxable land in certain 
counties in Colorado by state, municipal, and other local units of 
L , .Stewart y_. City and County of Denver (1921),. 70 Co-lo. 514. 
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government has reduced the tax base of a number of counties. The 
committee recognizes that purchases of taxable land by government 
units often are made in the general interest of the over-all economy 
of the state; however, the committee is concerned that benefits 
derived are obtained at the expense of communities in which the ac-
quisitions are made. For instance, despite the fact that tax exempt 
lands are removed from the tax rolls, usually there is no corres-
ponding reduction in the need for miscellaneous county services, 
schools, fire and police protection, etc., and there even may be an 
increase in the need for these services. Therefore, any reduction 
in the tax base often adds to the mill levies of existing property 
tax payers. In this manner, continuing governmental expenses for 
services to the tax exempt property actually is borne by the tax-
payers of the county in which the land is purchased. 
Committee Recommendations 
The committee believes that the burden resulting from erosion 
of the tax base of a local community must be considered as part of 
the expense for obtaining tax exempt property and should be met by 
the community deriving benefit from the acquisition of the property. 
With this in mind, the committee reaffirms its 196~ recommendation 
for a proposed constitutional amendment to allow the General As-
sembly to provide for payments in lieu of taxes in the event the 
tax base of a local community is adversely affected by removal of 
land from the tax rolls by state and local governmental units. The 
committee again recommends that Article X, Section 4, Colorado 
Constitution, be amended as follows: 
Section 4. Public property exempt - except. 
The property, real and personal, of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, and other municipal AND 
QUASI-MUNICIPAL corporations, and public libraries 
shall be exempt from taxation, PROVIDED, THAT tHE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY PROVIDE BY LAW FOR THE MAKING 
OF PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES WITH RESPECT TO ANY 
SUCH PROPERTY. 
Private Religious, Charitable, and 
Educational Property 
Article X, Section 5, Colorado Constitution, provides: 
"Property, real and personal, that is used solely and exclusively 
for religious worship, for schools or for strictly charitable 
purposes, also cemeteries not used or held for private or corporate 
profit, shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by 
general law." The provision "unless otherwise provided by general 
law" gives discretion to the General Assembly to limit or qualify 
exemptions on private real property. As previously mentioned, 
similar discretionary power is lacking with respect to public prop-
erties. Although the General Assembly has authority to limit . 
exemptions on private real property, the power to extend exemptions 
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to "homesteadsu and residences of aged persons is prohibited. 
Article X, Section 6, Colorado Constitution, states: "All laws 
exempting from taxation, property other than that heretofore men-
tioned, shall be void; ••• " In any event, with the exception of 
adding a definition for schools and requiring "ownership" as a pre-
requisite for obtaining a property tax exemption, the General 
Assembly has accepted the provisions of Article X, Section 5, with-
out reservation.2 
Impact of Private Tax Exempt Real Property 
Exemptions for private religious, charitable, and educational 
properties comprise about 15 per cent of the tax exempt property in 
Colorado (see Research Publication 102, Colorado Legislative 
Council). If this property were added to the tax rolls, the esti-
mated tax base of counties, municipalities, and school districts 
would be increased by only three per cent. Although this burden 
appears to be relatively insignificant as a state total, the impact 
to individual counties and cities could be appreciable. For in-
stance, latest available estimates of the assessed value of private 
tax exempt property in the City and County of Denver totals 
$70,000,000 or 6.6 per cent of the tax base of the community. 
In the April, 1966, issue of The National Civic Review,3 it 
was reported that housing projects sponsored by churches, labor 
unions, and other nonprofit organizations probably would account 
for a rapidly growing share of homebuilding activity in the next 
few years. Three reasons are cited: 1) the Senior Citizen Housing 
Act: -- Public Law 87-723 -- passed by Congress, 2) a growing 
public awareness of the need for adequate housing for the elderly 
and disadvantaged, and 3) an increase in the number of nonprofit 
groups entering the housing field. Substantiating these findings 
is the recent growth in senior citizen "high rise" apartments in 
the urban areas of Colorado. Since the advent of the federal leg-
islation in 1962, the original cost value of these homes for the 
elderly has exceeded $25,000,000. 
Property tax exemptions for private institutions tradition-
ally are based on two assumptions: 1) if the se4vices were not 
performed by a private agency, the burdens of government would in-
crease; and 2) tax exemptions foster moral, cultural, and social 
development of the community. Separation of church and state also 
is considered a fundamental purpose in granting property tax 
exemptions to religious organizations. In any event. the state of 
Colorado recognizes the worthiness of certain types of activities 
2. Section 137-2-1? C.R.S. 1963, as amended. 
3. ~ National Civic Review, April 1966, page 225. 
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and has attempted to encourage these programs through a subsidy, 
that is, exemption from ad valorem taxes. The committee is con-
cerned, however, that the subsidy fostered at the state level is 
not supported by the over-all revenue sources of the state; rather, 
the subsidy for this state program is borne by the tax base of 
local government. The reason for this is that the property tax is 
the prime source of revenue for local government. In 1965, prop-
erty taxes levied in Colorado amounted to $34,344,328 for cities 
and towns, $63,623,246 for counties, and $186,252,599 for public 
schools. The Local Affairs Study Commission also reports that from 
38 per cent to 50 per cent of all local government revenues are 
derived from property taxes. 
In a sense, the General Assembly has recognized that the ad 
valorem tax base is not sufficient to meet all the needs of local 
government, and that tax exemptions granted at the state level re-
duce the effectiveness of the property tax. The General Assembly 
has minimized this adverse impact to one sector of local government 
-- schools -- through the "School Foundation Act." The formula for 
the distribution of state school monies is based on local effort 
encompassing property tax valuations and adjusted gross income as 
measures of local ability to pay. Thus local communities with a 
relatively large amount of exempt property receive a proportion-
ately higher amount of state school monies. 
On the other hand, cities and towns receive little in the way 
of state support. Article X, Section 7, prohibits the General 
Assembly from imposing taxes for the purposes of any county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation, but authority may be vested 
with municipal corporations to assess and collect taxes for the sup-
port of local government. Municipalities must maintain services 
at a level that meets the needs of the exempt institutions. It is 
true that some of the direct services to exempt institutions are 
supported through a system of fees or charges. The nature of the 
service usually determines whether tax exempt institutions pay for 
benefits received. Benefits of municipal water and power services, 
for instance, easily may be assessed on a fee basis according to the 
quantity of service provided. Trash collection costs and special 
assessments for curbs, streets, gutters, and paving also are col-
lected from exempt institutions. Finally, tax exempt institutions 
contribute to the costs of municipal services through building 
permit fees and charges for land use variances. 
Alternate Suggestions to Reduce the Impact of Tax Exemptions 
Fees in Lieu of Taxes. A number of alternate suggestions 
were made to the committee to reduce the impact of tax exempt prop-
erty on local government. First of all, the committee explored 
the possibility of expanding.the present system ~f f~es in lieu of 
taxes on certain types of private property. Again, it must be kept 
in mind that any proposed legislation could no~ be.extended.to . 
include public properties in view of the constitutional limitation 
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prohibiting modification of the exemption for public properties. 
The committee called upon the expertise of the Colorado Municipal 
League to assist in an exploration of service charges in lieu of 
taxes for exempt charitable, religious, and educational properties. 
With this in mind, a major role of municipal government is 
to protect property -- police and fire fighting services, ordinance 
enforcement, planning and zoning, and nuisance regulation. Although 
these activities of local government are of direct benefit to all 
property owners, measurement of value received cannot be computed in 
the same manner as a simple meter reading for water or electric 
power consumption. Nevertheless, these services are essential to 
owners of both taxable property and owners of tax exempt property. 
Other governmental activities of benefit to nontaxable institutions 
include: street maintenance, street cleaning and lighting, snow 
removal, and transportation services. 
Problems Posed bfi Service Charges. Perhaps an initial road-
block to the "service c arge concept" is Article X, Section 3, 
Colorado Constitution. In part, this section provides: "All taxes 
shall be uniform upon each of the various classes of real and per-
sonal property located within the territorial limits of the author-
ity levying the tax, which shall prescribe such methods and regu-
lations as shall secure just and equalized valuations for assessments 
of taxes upon all property, real and personal, located within the 
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, ••• " Measurement 
and equalization of costs of governmental services based on a ser-
vice charge rated according to benefits received on the one hand and 
a general tax on the other would be extremely difficult to achieve. 
How could uniformity be achieved if one segment of the population 
pays a general tax, based on assessed valuation of property, while 
another group pays a specific fee according to benefits received? 
As previously mentioned, municipal services directly affect 
property owners. Perhaps the following list of functions of city 
and town government may best illustrate the types of services avail-





Public Works Administration 
A) Street paving, curbs, gutters, etc. (special 
assessments)* 
g
Bl Street cleaning 
Snow removal 
Street lighting 
*Functions in which institutions exempt from ad valorem taxes pay 












Planning and zoning 
A) Construction permits* 








Parks and recreation facilities 
General administration 
Segregation of the aforementioned items into areas of direct 
benefit to tax exempt property owners is difficult. Certainly it 
is easier to justify assessment of costs for fire and police ser-
vices to the exempt institutions than services of libraries, parks, 
and over-all costs of city administration. Nevertheless, to some 
degree, most of the functions enumerated above provide some service 
to tax exempt property owners. 
Assuming that constitutional objections to service charges 
could be met, a system of service fees certainly might add to the 
complexity of local government administration, and in view of the 
fact that an aggregate increase of local revenues of only three per 
cent would result if all private exempt institutions were placed on 
the tax rolls, the amount of revenue derived from a service charge 
program probably would not be sufficient to offset the administra-
tive costs involved. 
Non-school Taxes For Exempt Properties. In view of the prob-
lems posed by fees, a second sugges~ion was made to the committee 
to recommend requiring private tax exempt institutions to pay non-
school property taxes. The suggestion was made on the basis that 
elimination of school taxes would reduce the major burden of prop-
erty taxes, while not forcing a reduction in the tax base of towns 
and counties. State aid to schools would continue to offset the 
reduction to the property tax base for schools. 
In viewing this suggestion, the committee expressed concern 
with the impact of nonschool taxes on the tax exempt institutions. 
Municipal, general county, and special improvement property 
levies in 1965 totaled $97,967,000. An increase of three per cent, 
*Functions in which institutions exempt from ad valorem taxes pay 
service charges, fees, or special assessments. 
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or $2,939,000 probably would result if private exempt institutions 
were added to the tax rolls of cities, counties (excluding general 
county school taxes), and special districts. Although the increased 
revenue to local governments does not appear to be substantial, the 
impact to individual exempt institutions would be significant. For 
instance, municipal mill levies range from 1.70 mills in Bonanza to 
46.00 mills in Cripple Creek and Victor, Colorado. In comparison, 
the average municipal mill levy reported by the Tax Commission in 
1965 is 14.72 mills. Other cities and towns with mill levies in ex-
cess of 30 mills include: Central City (42.00), Crested Butte 
(37.35), De Beque (32.00), Erie (37.89), Frederick (35.00). Frisco 
(31.00), Genoa (32.62), Hayden (33.25), Log Lane Village (35.60), 
Meade (33.39), Milliken (33.00), Ouray (34.00), Rangely (40.00), Red 
Cliff (44.69), and Silverton (39.00). 
For the most part, the smaller cities and towns lean more 
heavily on the property tax for support than the larger communities. 
For example, the mill levies in the ten largest cities in Colorado 
in 1965 were as follows: Denver (14.60), Pueblo (19.00), Colorado 
Springs (19.38), Aurora (10.50), Boulder (9.70), Englewood (15.30), 
Arvada (13.00), Greeley (17.75), Fort Collins (15.09), Grand Junc-
tion (15.00), and Littleton (10.70). Total general government 
operating revenues in the City and County of Denver in 1964 amounted 
to $76,787,000; $26,168,000 or 34.l per cent of that total revenue 
was derived from property taxes. 
Requiring private tax exempt institutions to pay property 
taxes for nonschool purposes would result in a state-wide average 
property tax to private religious, charitable, and educational in-
stitutions of 34.47 per cent of the property tax levies on current 
taxable property. 
Clarification of Standards for Granting Tax Exemptions. The 
third and final major suggestion made to the committee involved 
re-examination of the standards by which institutions qualify for 
tax exempt status. As pointed out by Mr. Carper, Tax Commissioner, 
at the March 29 meeting of the committee: 
•.. the constitution contains four lines for the 
exemption of charitable, religious, and educa-
tional property. Similarly, the statutes contain 
only 13 lines with respect to the exemption of 
private property. Thus the criteria for exemp-
tion of charitable and religious property is out-
lined in the Constitution and statutes as inter-
preted by the Colorado Supreme Court. Since the 
Court has followed a liberal rule of construction 
on ruling on exempt status of religious, chari-
table, and educational properties, are the guide-
lines established by the Supreme Court valid 
today? Is there a need for redefining what con-
stitutes a charity? 
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Prior to 1961, the county assessors were charged with the 
responsibility for granting tax exemptions to religious, charitable, 
and educational institutions. It would be safe to say that within 
the guidelines of court decisions there were 63 different bases for 
granting tax exemptions. Chapter 260, Session Laws of Colorado 
1961, vested authority with the Tax Commission to determine the 
propriety of exemptions in Colorado. The Commission is in the pro• 
cess of reviewing every ad valorem tax exemption for charitable, 
religious, and educational property in Colorado, as well as granting 
or denying all new applications for exemptions. In order to review 
the basis of decisions made by the Commission, the committee staff 
reviewed 1191 claims filed with the Commission. 
Basis Upon Which Exemptions Are Granted 
The exemptions granted by the Tax Commission closely follow 
the rulings of the Colorado Supreme Court, and, in the event the 
Court has not ruled on a specific major class of property, such as 
"senior citizen housing," the Commission usually requests the ad-
vice of the Attorney General. A detailed analysis of Supreme Court 
decisions upon which the Tax Commission has based a number of its 
decisions is contained in the accompanying staff report. In gener-
al, the determination of what constitutes a charity poses the most 
difficult question for the Commission. Mr. Howard Latting, Chairman 
of the Colorado Tax Commission, suggested that the following six 
qualifications are essential conditions for an organization to be 







the organization is nonprofit; 
no part of the net earnings of the organization 
inures to any private shareholder or individual; 
the exempt property is used for the actual opera-
tion of the claimed exempt activity; 
the property is not used or operated by the owner 
or any other person so as to benefit anyone 
through the distribution of profits, payment of 
excessive charges or compensations or the more 
advantageous pursuit of their business or profes-
sion; 
the property is not used for fraternal or lodge 
purposes or for social club purposes unless such 
use is purely incidental to the charitable 
activities for which the exemption is claimed; 
and 
all properties of the corporation are irrevocably 
dedicated to charitable purposes and upon liquida-
tion of the corporation, no benefits will inure 
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to any private person, but shall be transferred 
to some other nonprofit charitable organization. 
Extent of Exemptions. Once a decision is made that an insti-
tution qualifies as a charitable, religious, or educational acti-
vity, the Tax Commission must then determine that the property 
actually is used for the purpose for which the exemption is granted. 
In other words, a church or charitable activity which owns income 
property or even vacant land held for future development can not 
qualify for a property tax exemption for such property. Also the 
Commission constantly is faced with property usage which is related 
to the activities or functions of the exempt institution but which 
may not be essential to the purpose. For instance, are parking lots 
essential to the conduct of church services? The Commission has 
ruled that when a parking lot is used solely for the exempt activity, 
a property tax exemption may be granted. However, if parking spaces 
are leased for other reasons, the exemption is denied. In conclu-
sion, the committee agrees with the strict interpretations of the 
Tax Commission that the use of the property must be essential to the 
purpose for which the exemption is granted, if a property tax exemp-
tion is to be allowed. The committee applauds the decisions of the 
Commission and supports continued efforts to interpret the law in a 
strict manner. 
Senior Citizen Housing. Perhaps the most controversial area 
of tax exemptions reviewed by the committee involved senior citizen 
housing. The Federal Housing Authority under Public Law 87-723 
provides low interest loans to nonprofit corporations to assist in 
developing low-cost housing for the elderly. Specifically, the 
federal act is designed to encourage the development of new or re-
habilitated living units which are for the use of elderly persons 
(over 62 years of age) or handicapped persons. Following enactment 
of Public Law 87-723 in 1962, charitable, religious, and trade 
associations have established a number of senior citizen homes in 
the urban areas of Colorado. The estimated total fixed assets of 
these homes is in excess of $25,000,000. 
Charges were made to the committee that some senior citizen 
homes were being constructed as luxury-type apartments and that the 
income of a number of dwellers was above average. Furthermore, it 
was brought to the attention of the committee that in order to 
achieve full occupancy, units were being rented to physically able 
persons under 62 years of age. In other words, standards were not 
being met either as to income or age. Many of the senior citizen 
homes also require an occupancy fee ranging from $600 to $8,000, 
suggesting that little consideration is given to the destitute. 
For these reasons, charitable tax exemptions for senior citizen 
homes are being questioned. 
On the other hand, after careful analysis of the concept of 
charity as outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court decisions and a 
recent California court decision, Fifield Manor v. County of Los 
Angeles (1961), 10 Cal. 242, the Tax Commission, fortified with an 
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opinion of the Attorney General, ruled that senior citizen homes 
qualify as a charitable activity for the purpose of obtaining an ad 
valorem tax exemption in Colorado. 
The Fifield Case appears to be especially pertinent to Colo-
rado in view of the similarity of constitutional provisions of 
Colorado and California with respect to charitable property tax 
exemptions. The California District Court of A~peals ruled 
in Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 10 Cal. Reporter 
242, that nonprofit corporations were entitled to property tax ex-
emption for property devoted to homes for the aged, although occu-
pied mainly by middle income persons who had been self-employed, 
and where charges did not yield more than actual costs. The court 
concluded: 
The courts have long recognized and declared 
that charity is not limited to giving alms, is 
not confined to relief of the poor, may extend to 
the rich in areas where they are not able to care 
for themselves, and extends to those social ob-
jectives which promote the general welfare and 
would be served by the government in the absence 
of philanthropic enterprises such as homes for the 
aged. Historically, and well-nigh unanimously, 
the courts have found homes for the aged to be 
charitable institutions where conducted at cost or 
less. They have also recognized that man, especi-
ally the old, does not live by bread alone; that 
though he be able to pay for all material wants he 
nevertheless may be dependent upon his fellow man 
or the government to protect him from the haunting 
fear of loss of all his property with resultant 
poverty, fear of illness or other physical dis-
ability overtaking him with no one near to help, 
fear of the loneliness arising from absence of 
social contacts, fear of any of the tragedies of 
old age where there is no one standing by to help. 
The test is not found in the question of what 
financial ability does the recipient possess, but 
what are his needs, alleviation of which consti-
tutes a worthy social value. We apprehend that the 
financial test becomes pertinent only when the occu-
pants of an old age home pay more than the cost to 
the home of what it furnishes them. 
(1) In the light of these authorities it 
seems clear that a home for the aged which caters 
to wealthy persons and furnishes them those ser-
vices and care needed by the old and infirm, rich 
or poor, does not cease to be a charitable insti-
tution so long as its charges do not yield more 
than the actual cost of operation; that it does 
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cease to have that status when the occupants pay 
more than the cost to the home, thus resulting in 
a profit and converting it into a non-charitable 
institution. 
Committee Recommendations 
Senior Citizen Homes. The committee agrees that tradition-
ally aid to the aged has been recognized as a charitable function 
and that relief of poverty is not the only condition for qualifying 
for a tax exemption as a charity. It is a matter of common know-
ledge that aged people require care and attention apart from finan-
cial assistance. Senior citizen homes do provide special services 
and equipment. Among the services readily available for most 
senior homes are: emergency medical care; temporary nursing ser-
vices; central dining facilities; surveillance of residents to 
insure their well-being; emergency alarms; specially designed fa-
cilities to assist the handicapped and the infirm such as wider 
doorways, low shelving, handrails for bathtubs, and nonskid floors; 
and finally site locations accessible to transportation, medical 
services, churches, and other community activities. 
The committee expresses concern, however, that instances 
exist in which persons residing in senior homes are less than 62 
years of age and are not handicapped. The committee believes the 
law should be amended to prevent abuse of the concept on which 
senior citizen housing is based. In other words, employed physi-
cally-able persons under 62 years of age should be prohibited from 
taking advantage of this tax exemption. Therefore, the committee 
recommends the following amendment to Section 137-2-1 (8), 1965 
Permanent Supplement to C.R.S. 1963: 
Property, real and personal, that is owned and used 
solely and exclusively for strictly charitable pur-
poses, and not for private or corporate profit. 
SENIOR CITIZEN HOUSING SHALL BE CLASSED AS CHARI-
TABLE ENTERPRISES AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION; 
PROVIDED THAT SUCH HOUSING UNITS SHALL BE NONPROFIT 
OPERATIONS AND THE PROPERTY REAL AND PERSONAL IS 
DEDICATED IN PERPETUITY TO CHARITABLE PURPOSES; AND 
PROVIDED FURTHER THAT THE HOUSING UNITS ARE SPECI-
FICALLY DESIGNED FOR ELDERLY OR HANDICAPPED PERSONS. 
A SENIOR CITIZEN HOUSING OPERATION SHALL NOT BE 
EXEMPT IF MORE THAN 5 PER CENT OF THE UNITS ARE 
LEASED TO PERSONS UNDER 62 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT 
HANDICAPPED. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SUBSECTION, A 
"HANDICAPPED PERSON" MEANS A PERSON WHO HAS A PHYSI-
CAL IMPAIRMENT WHICH: 
(1) IS EXPECTED TO BE OF LONG-CONTINUED AND 
INDEFINITE DURATION; 
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(2) SUBSTANTIALLY IMPEDES HIS ABILITY TO 
LIVE INDEPENDENTLY; AND 
(3) IS OF SUCH NATURE THAT HIS ABILITY TO 
LIVE INDEPENDENTLY COULD BE IMPROVED BY MORE SUIT-
ABLE HOUSING CONDITIONS. 
Other Charitable Activities. In viewing property tax exemp-
tions for charitable activities (fraternal lodges, hospitals, 
veterans' associations, etc.) the committee recommends that all in-
stitutions filing for a tax exemption be required to demonstrate 
financial evidence of their charitable activities. The committee 
considered recommending enactment of specific legislation requiring 
institutions qualifying for a charitable tax exemption to allocate 
a minimum percentage of fees, dues, donations, charges, and other 
income to purely charitable activities. The committee, however, 
did not have sufficient information on the financial status of 
charities to develop a reasonable minimum standard. Therefore, the 
committee simply recommends that as a condition for obtaining an 
ad valorem tax exemption the Tax Commission require each chari-
table organization to submit an annual financial statement or tax 
return to the Commission. The financial statement should contain an 
itemized list of expenses including amounts spent for strictly 
charitable purposes. Also, the committee recommends that the Tax 
Commission, after analyzing such financial statements, report back 
to the General Assembly with specific recommendations on more speci-
fic standards to be written into law regarding charitable exemptions. 
Religious Exemptions. The committee believes that the intent 
of the exemption for religious worship outlined in the Constitution 
(Article X, Section 5) should be strictly construed. The Tax Com-
mission currently denies exemptions for vacant land, miscellaneous 
income property, and other miscellaneous property that is not 
directly involved or necessary to the conduct of religious services. 
The committee supports the rulings of the Commission on this matter 
and suggests that the following clarifying language be added to 
Section 137-2-1 (6), 1965 Permanent Supplement to C.R.S. 1963: 
(6) Property, real and personal, that is 
owned and used solely and exclusively for religi-
ous worship, and not for private or corporate 
profit. THE EXEMPTION CONTEMPLATED IN THIS SUB-
SECTION SHALL BE LIMITED TO ANY BUILDING OR 
EDIFICE IN WHICH RELIGIOUS WORSHIP IS CONDUCTED, 
AND ANY LAND WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO MEET ZONING 
STANDARDS AND BUILDING REQUIREMENTS, OR PROVIDE 
PARKING. 
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TAX EXEMPT PRQPERTY 
A study of tax exempt property was initiated in the 1963-64 
biennium under a Legislative Council Committee on Tax Exempt Prop-
erty. At the direction of the committee, the first two years were 
devoted to an inventory of all tax exempt property in Colorado and 
preempted an opportunity for the committee to spend needed time to 
review possible changes in constitutional or statutory provisions. 
H.J.R. 1024, 1965 session, specifically directed the commit-
tee to review possible clarification or changes in the constitution 
and statutes relating to tax exempt property; needed improvement 
in the administration of the statutes; an:i revision of the system 
of keeping public records on exemptions heretofore granted, as well 
as current exemptions. The Committee on Tax Exempt Property ~stab-
lished two phases for the study of property tax exemptions: 
1) the 1965 interim study period was devoted to a review of public 
propertn and 2) the committee utili~ed the 1966 interim for a re-
view of private educational, religious, and charitable properties. 
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR PUBLIC PROPERTIES 
Since the adoption of Colorado's Constitution, there has 
been a provision exempting public property from ad valorem taxes. 
This provision has remained unchanged since enactment of the Con-
stitution and ~eads as follows: 
The property, real and personal, of the state, 
counties, cities, towns and other municipal 
corporations and public libraries, shall be 
exempt from taxation. 
Article X, Section 4, Colorado Constitution, according to deci-
sions of the Colorado Supreme Court, means that ownership is the 
only factor to be considered in determining whether public prop-
erty is exempt from property taxes. For example, in Stewart v. 
City and County of Denver ( 921), 70 Colo. 514, the court held: 
According to the express language of the 
constitution, there is but one condition essen-
tial to their (the land's) exemption from taxa-
tion, and that is ownership by the city. 
In this case the exemption from taxation of 
the property of cities is so clear and expressive 
that there would seem to be no room for any doubt, 
or necessity of resorting to any rule of construc-
tion. The exemption is absolute, and depends upon 
no condition but ownership by the city. 
Thus,the court ruled that regardless of the use of the property 
or the fact that the property owned by one govermental juris-
diction is located in another jurisdiction, the properties of 
the state of Colorado and local government jurisdictions are. tax 
exempt. 
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With respect to federal properties, no mention is made in 
Colorado's Constitution of the exempt status of federal properties. 
Colorado's Enabling Act (Section 4) provides: 
••• , and that no taxes shall be imposed by the 
state on lands or property therein belonging 
to or which may hereafter be purchased by the 
United States. 
The impact of this blanket exemption for federal properties may 
be minimized by recent decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, which will be discussed in detail in a later section. 
Statutory Exemption of Public Property 
The statutory provision relating to the taxation of public 
property is contained in Section 137-2-1(5), 1965 Permanent Cumula-
tive Supplement to C.R.S. 1963. This subsection, in accordance with 
the constitution, exempts: 
(5) Public libraries and the property, real and 
personal, of the state and its political subdivisions. 
The General Assembly made an unsuccessful attempt to require 
the payment of fees in lieu of taxes on lands acquired by the Game, 
Fish, and Parks Department in 1961, by requiring a school fee equi-
valent to twelve mills on such land. The constitutionality of the 
fees on game and fish lands was contested first in the District 
Court of Denver where it was declared unconstitutional, and later 
that decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado (Game 
and Fish Commission of Colorado v. Cleland N. Feast, et al, N0:--
20489, Colorado Supreme Court). In part, the court held: 
"We are not impressed -- nor should we be -- by the fact 
that the levy is labeled by the legislature as a 'school fee' 
rather than a school tax. See Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 
26 P. 2d 1051 (1933). In nearly all respects this section levies 
a tax on State Game and Fish Commission property identical with 
the tax levied in each affected school district on private prop-
erty. Therefore, we are in accord with the trial court's state-
ment wherein it said: 
In our opinion, the legislation is an attempt 
by the legislature to do indirectly what cannot 
be done directly. It seems apparent that the 
proposed fees are to replace the taxes that had 
been paid by the individuals who owned the prop-
erty before it was acqured by the Game and Fish 
Commission. The fees, as shown above, are com-
puted on an assessment based on the value of the 
property. The statutes contain no element of 
regulation or restraint pertaining to game and 
fish laws whereby it could be argued that they 
are an excise fee or tax. The legislation, in 
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our opinion, is for th• primary purpose 
of raising revenue. When this is the case, 
the fee loses its character, as such, and 
becomes a tax for revenue. Although, the 
legislature uses the word 'fees,' the lan-
guage of the legislature in denominating 
the nature of a tax or fee to be assessed 
is not determinative of its character. In 
our opinion, the fee being computed on an 
assessment based on valuation is a tax and 
is in violation of Article 10, Section 4 
of the State Constitution." 
Constitutional Provisions in Other States 
The exemption of public properties from taxation under 
Colorado's Constitution is typical of the provision of the con-
·stitutions of at least 17 other states -- Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mi'ssouri, Montana, Neb-
raska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma. Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington. The remaining state constitutions 
appear to be more strict in allowing property tax exemptions for 
public properties. Some states -- Tennessee, Texas, South Caro-
lina, and Wyoming -- limit property taK exemptions to property 
used for a "governmental" purpose. A distinction between a "pro-
prietary" purpose and a·"governmental" purppse is outlined in a 
Wyoming Supreme Court Case -- Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board 
of Equalization (1958), 333 P.2nd 700. The'court held that the 
sale of electricity by a municipality through a municipally owned 
electric plant is a proprietary and not a governmental function. 
A tax exemption for a municipal electric plant in Wyoming was 
denied on the basis of this ruling by the Wyoming cwrt. 
The Wyoming Constitution (Article 15, Section 12) provides: 
Exemptions from taxation. The property of 
the United States, the state, counties, cities, 
towns, school districts and municipal corpora-
tions when used primarily for a governmental 
purpose, and public libraries, lots with the 
buildings thereon used exclusively for reli-
gious worship, church parsonages, church schools, 
and public cemeteries, shall be exempt from 
taxation and such other property as the legis-
lature may by general law provide. 
The following statement shall be enclosed 
in the foregoing proposed amendment by the 
secretary of the State of Wyoming: 
This proposed amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the State of Wyoming allows pro~erty 
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of the Federal, State and political sub-
divisions thereof, to be subject to taxa-
tion in the event that such property is 
being used for purposes other than govern-
mental, in order that nongovernmental act-
ivities upon governmental 'lands can bear 
their fair share of the tax burden within 
this state. 
The constitutions of the states of California and South 
Dakota permit limited taxation of public properties under spe-
cial circumstances. Article XIII, Section 1, California Con-
stitution provides: 
••• and further provided, that property used 
for free public libraries and free museums, grow-
ing crops, property used exclusively for public 
schools, and such as may belong to this State, 
or to any county, city and county, or municipal 
corporation within this State shall be exempt 
from taxation, except such lands and the improve-
ments thereon located o~tsid~ of the county, city 
and county,or municipal corporation owning 
same as were subject to taxation at the time of 
the acquisition of the same by said county, 
city and county, or municipal corporation; pro-
vided, that no improvements of any character 
whatever constructed by any county, city and 
county, or municipal corporation shall be sub-
ject to taxation. All lands or improvements 
thereon, belonging to any county, city and county, 
or municipal corporation, not exempt from taxa-
tion, shall be assessed by the assessor of the 
county, city and county,or municipal corporation 
in which said lands or improvements are located, 
and said assessment shall be subject to review 
equalization and adjustment by the State Board of 
Equalization ••• 
The apparent purpose of the aforementioned provision is to 
safeguard the tax revenue of small counties in which large munici-
pal corporations purchase extensive holdings, and which, except 
for the provision, would be exempt from local taxation. 
On the other hand, the South Dakota Constitution (Article 
XI, Section 5) provides that: 
The property of the United States and of the 
state, county and municipal corporations, both 
real and personal, shall be exempt from taxation, 
provided, however, that all state owned lands ac-
quired under the provisions of the rural credit 
act may be taxed by the local taxing districts for 
county, township and school purposes, and all st~te 
owned lands, known as public shooting areas, ac-
quired under the provisions of Section 25.0106 
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SOC 1939 and acts amendatory thereto, may 
be taxed by the local taxing districts for 
county, township and school purposes in such 
manner as the Legislature may provide. 
Minnesota's Constitution (Article 9, Section 1) authorizes 
municipal corporations to· levy and collect assessments for local 
improvements upon property benefited without regard to a cash 
valuation of the property. In particular, the constitution pro-
vides for the assessment of public property, particularly state 
lands, for benefits received from the construction of trunk high-
ways. 
The constitutions of the states of Alaska, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Vir-
ginia state that public properties may be exempt from taxation. 
In these states, the legislatures have the power to require the 
collection of taxes on certain types of public properties. An 
example of a state constitutional provision in this category is 
Alaska (Article IX, Sections 4 and 5): · 
Exem~tions. The real·and personal property 
of thetate·or its political subdivisions shall 
be exempt from taxation under conditions and 
exceptions which may be provided by law. All, 
or any portion of, property used exclusively 
for non-profit religious, charitable, cemetery, 
or educational purposes, as defined by law, shall 
be exempt from taxation. Other exemptions of 
like or different kind may be granted by general 
law. All valid existing exemptions shall be 
retained until otherwise provided by law. 
The remaining state constitutions make no mention of tax ex-
emptions for public corporations with the result that the state leg-
islatures in these states may, or may not, provide for the exemp-
tion of public properties from taxation -- Alabama, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin. 
Taxation of Leasehold Interests 
A few other states have enacted legislation to permit the 
taxation of leasehold interests in public properties. The Alaska 
Constitution (Article IX, Section 5) specifically provides for tte 
taxation of leasehold interests: 
Sec. 5. Interests in government properta• Private 
leaseholds, contracts, or interests in Ian or prop-
erty owned or held by the United States, the State, 
or its political subdivisions, shall be taxable to 
the extent of the interests. 
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The Michigan legislature adopted Public Act No. 189 in 
1953, providing for a tax on the leasehold interest of property 
exempt from taxation. This act included a requirement for taxing 
the leasehold interest of federal property. Public Act No. 189, 
1953 session, as amended by Public Act No. 226, Laws of 1962, fol-
lows: 
211.181 Taxation of lessees and users of 
tax-exempt property -- exce!tions. 
Section 1. When any rea property which 
for any reason is exempt from taxation is 
leased, loaned, or otherwise made available 
to and used by a private individual, associa-
tion, or corporation in connection with a bus-
iness conducted for profit, except where the 
use is by way of a concession in or relative 
to the use of a public airport, park, market, 
fair ground, or similar property which is 
available to the 'use of the general public, 
the lessees or users thereof shall be subject 
to taxation in the same amount and to the same 
extent as though the lessee or user were the 
owner of such property. The foregoing shall 
not apply to federal property for which pay-
ments are made in lieu of taxes in amounts 
equivalent to taxes which might otherwise 
be lawfully assessed or property of any state-
supported educational institution nor to any 
surplus highway property located in a city of 
1,000,000 or more leased prior to June 10, 1953, 
by the state highway commissioner or his desig-
nated agent where the original lease or its re-
newal did not provide for the payment of such 
tax by either party to the lease, and where no 
adjustment of the rental price for the land was 
m~de in recognition ·of the provisions of the act. 
211.182 Assessment and collection -- action 
of assumpsit. 
Section 2. Taxes shall be assessed to such 
lessees or users of real property and collected 
in the same manner as taxes assessed to owners 
of real property except that such taxes shall not 
become a lien against the property. When due, 
such taxes shall constitute a debt due from the 
lessee or user to the township, city, village, county 
county, and school district for which the taxes were 
were assessed and shall be recovered by direct 
action of assumpsit. 
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The United States Supreme Court in a series of cases handed 
down in 1958 upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan act pro-· 
viding for the taxation of leasehold interests in federal property. 
In Citfi of Detroit v. Murray Corporation (1958}, 355 U.S. 458, the 
court eld, in part, that " ••• We see no essential difference so 
far as constitutional tax immunity is concerned between taxing a 
person for using property he possesses and taxing him for possess-
ing property 1 he uses when in both instances he uses the property 
for his own private ends ••• " The court made this distinction even 
though the law does not specifically provide that the person or 
lessee in possession of the property is "taxed for the privilege 
of using or possessing" the property. 
The Supreme Court also held that: 
There is no claim that the challenged taxes 
discriminate against persons holding government 
property. To the contrary the tax is a general 
tax which applies and has been applied through-
out the State. If anythinq the economic burden 
on the United States is more remote and less cer-
tain than in other cases where this Court has 
upheld taxes on private parties. Of.course the 
Government will eventually feel the financial 
burden of at least some of the tax but the one 
principle in this area which has heretofore been 
clearly settled is that the imposition of an in-
creased financial burden on the government does 
not by itself invalidate a state tax •••• state 
law specifically authorizes assessment against 
the person in possession. And the taxing auth-
orities were careful not to attempt to tax the 
Government's interest in the property. 
In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the position 
that a state may tax the private use of public proerty as long as 
the state is careful not to tax the government's interest in the 
property. 
On the basis of this decision, perhaps it would be feas-
ible for the Colorado General Assembly to levy an entirely new 
tax on the use of public property. As previously mentioned, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that the only condition for the ex-
emption of state, county, and municipal lands from taxation is-
ownership. However, this decision is based on taxation of proper-
ty and not on a concept of a tax on "use." Of course, a question 
r~mains as to whether the court would hold that a tax on "use" is 
a mere subterfuge and actually is an attempt to tax the property 
of the state, county, or towns. This latter argument may, however, 
be minimized by the recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment for Colorado 
A proposed Constitutional amendment was introduced in the 
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Colorado House of Representatives quring the 1964 session to per-
mit the General Assembly to levy fees in lieu of taxes on state 
and local government properties. The resolution (H.C.R. No. 1011) 
was adopted by the House and subsequently amended by the Senate. 
However, the amended resolution did not receive the necessary two-
thirds vote of all members of the House. The vote in the House on 
final passage of the resolution was 41 ayes and 20 noes, with four 
absent members. 
A copy of the proposed amendment to Article X, Section 4, 
Colorado Constitution, as outlined in H.C.R. No. 1011 follows: 
Section 4. Public property exempt - except. 
The property, real and personal, of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, and other municipal 
AND QUASI-MUNICIPAL corporations, and public 
libraries shall be exempt from taxation, PROVIDED, 
THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY .. PROVIDE BY LAW FOR 
THE MAKING OF PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAX.ES WITH RE-
SPECT TO ANY SUCH PROPERTY. 
Public Hearing. A public hearing was held on July 26, 1965, 
by the Committee on Tax Exempt Property to review the merits of 
the present property tax exemption for public property, as well 
as to consider pros and cons of amending Section 4 of Article X. 
The committee hearing on tax exemptions for public properties 
revolved around three basic questions: 
1) Should activities of government competing with private 
industry support the property tax base of other units of govern-
ment in the taxing jurisdiction? In other words, should a muni-
cipal electric power company competing with private power com-
panies pay property taxes to schools and counties in the same 
manner required of the private power company? 
2) Should a governmental unit owning property in another 
taxing jurisdiction pay property taxes to the taxing jurisdiction 
in which the property is located? In such instances, is the pay-
ment of a property tax by a governmental unit to another govern-
mental unit justified because of the erosion of the propertv tax 
base of the taxing jurisdiction? For example, if a city.attempts to 
provide recreational services for its citizens and removes a large 
tract of land from the tax base of a small rural county, should 
the city contribute to the tax base of the county to compensate 
for loss in revenues? 
3) In the event governmental property is leased to private 
industry, should a tax be levied against the leasehold interest? 
Since utilization of public property derives a profit to a private 
lessee, should this interest in the use of public property be 
taxed in a manner similar to that if the lessee actually were the 
owner of the property? 
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Taxation of Certain Public Pro erties. 
At the pu ic earing on Ju y a num er o suggestions were made 
with respect to the taxation of public property. 
1) It was pointed out that the present trends call for con-
tinued expansion of quasi-public functions or activies that no 
longer are purely governmental in nature; for instance, a sizeable 
number of municipalities maintain their own electric power services. 
Recently, a bond issue providing for airport facilities and a 
training center for air lines personnel was instituted in Denver. 
Services of fire, police, sewage, etc., must be provided to all of 
these facilities. 
2) Large federal land holdings in Colorado limit the tax 
base of many rural counties, suggesting that further loss of tax-
able property in these areas through the acquisition of tax exempt 
property magnifies the burden of individual exemptions. Acquisi-
tion of lands to obtain water rights for cities, for example, erodes 
the tax base of a number of rural cou0ties. Mr. Frank Steljes, 
Park County Assessor, pointed out that approximately 60 per cent 
of the land in Park County is tax exempt. The Denver Water Board 
has acquired a total of 18,000 acre~ of land in this county, while 
the ColoLado Springs Water Department owns approximately 317 acres 
in the county. 
3) The committee also was urged to consider that the burden 
of support for the erosion of the tax base of a county through the 
acquisition of properties by cities located outside the county 
should be borne by the recipients of the benefits and not the prop-
erty owners of communities in which the property is acquired for 
. governmental programs. The demand of metroplitan communities for 
recreational facilities, water, etc., in rural areas of the state 
is in conflict with interests of rural property owners. If taxable 
land utilized for ranch purposes is purchased by a governmental 
agency for recreation, the land is removed from the tax rolls. Al-
though the tax base of the county decreases as a result of the tax 
exemption, local services and governmental expenses often do not 
decrease in proportion to the reduction in the tax base, suggesting 
the need for payments in lieu of taxes on property removed from the 
tax rolls. In other words, the community acquiring the property 
benefits from the tax exemption, but in so doing, a burden is placed 
on the existing community to maintain police, fire, and other ser-
vices for the exempt property. 
4) The tax exempt status for public property used for so-
called proprietary purposes such as electric power, transportation, 
property leased for private or commercial use, etc., places simi-
lar activities of private industry under a serious economic disad-
vantage. Tax exemptions for quasi-governmental functions therefore 
should be curtailed. 
5) Is there a real distinction between "use" of property 
and "use coupled with ownership?" In the event a commercial enter-
prise derives a profit through the use of public property, a tax 
exemption on the property or the use of the property would appear 
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to provide a tax advantage to this particular industry. The U.S. 
Supreme Court recognizes and upholds this concept that a tax on 
the use of public property levied against the lessee of the prop-
erty and not the public owners is reasonable and proper. 
Arguments in Opposition to a Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ment. Arguments presented in opposition to a proposed constitution-
'aramendment to allow the taxing of 1~rtain types of property used in governmental activities include: 
1) A tax levied on one governmental unit by another simply 
results in a shift of public funds between governmental units, add-
ing to the general expense of governmental operations. In the long 
run, the public bears the burden of these unnecessary administrative 
costs. 
2) Public recreation sites owned by a governmental unit 
and located in an adjoining county may provide recreational assets 
not only to the residents of the county owning the property but to 
the residents of the county in which the property is located. Fur-
thermore, such a recreational site may stimulate tourist activities 
in the area, actually enhancing the.economy of the community in 
which the site is located. 
3) The cost of local governmental services required by a 
tax exempt piece of property may be rather minute in comparison 
with the amount of tax money that could be collected from taxes 
levied on the property, suggesting that, if a tax were paid on 
the property, non-residents would be supporting the local program 
to a larger degree than could be justified. 
4) A reduction of revenues to a community as a result of 
increased tax exemptions may be compensated for by collection of 
monies from other sources. State aict or alternative taxes may be 
utilized to reduce the impact to counties in which a reduction of 
the property tax base has occurred. 
5) Tax exemptions simply magnify problems presented by 
uneconomical taxing units. Consideration may need to be given to 
the basic organizational structure of local government to insure 
that sufficient tax base exists for the support of local services. 
EDUCATIONAL, CHARITABLE, AND RELIGIOUS 
TAX EXEMPT PROPERTY 
A substantial difference exists between Colorado's consti-
tutional provision exempting public properties and the provision 
exempting private real properties. Whereas th; exemption fo~ 
governmental property is mandatory,_the ex;mption for educ?tion?l, 
reli~ious, and charitable property is conditio~ed upon legislative 
considerations. For instance, Article X, Section 5, Colorado Con-
1. "Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1965," Committee on Tax Exempt 
Property, Colorado Legislative Council. 
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stitution provides: 
Property, real and personal, that is used 
solely and exclusively for religious worship, 
for schools or for strictly charitable purposes, 
also cemeteries not used or held for private or 
corporate profit, shall be exempt from taxation, 
unless otherwise provided by general law. (emphasis 
added) 
Article X, Section 5, of the Constitution relating to tax 
exempt property for religious, school and charitable purposes, has 
been amended only once since the turn of the century. In 1936, a 
provision was added to permit an exemption from ad valorem taxa-
tion of personal property utilized by religious, charitable, and 
educational institutions. As previously mentioned, the General 
Assembly has the power to limit exemptions in these areas; however, 
the General Assembly may not extend tax exemptions to property 
utilized for other purposes. 
Statutory Provisions 
The statutory language relating to educational, religious, 
and charitable exemptions also has changed little over the years. 
Section 2571, Compiled Statutes of Colorado 1883, provides: "•·• 
fourth, lots with the buildings ~hereon, if said buildings are used 
solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for 
strictly charitable purposes; ••• " This section was rewritten in 
1902 with nearly identical language, and in 1921 the law was amended 
· to limit the exemption for schools to those not operating for pri-
vate or corporate profit (Laws of 1921, page 687). A definition 
of what constitutes a school also was added in 1933. The most sig-
nificant change in the language of the statutes applying to private 
tax exempt.property occurred in 1964 (Chapter 94, Laws of 1964); 
ownership was added as a criterion for obtaining an exemption from 
ad valorem taxes. Under this new provision the commission denied 
an exemption for a church used solely and exclusively for religious 
worship, because the property was owned by a real estate developer. 
Despite these aforementioned changes, the basic terminology of the 
ad valorem exempt statute as it relates to private and charitable 
properties, utilizing the words solely and exclusively, has remained 
the same throughout Colorado's history. 
Since the basic terminology of the law as it relates to pri-
vate exemptions has been amended only slightly, the courts have con-
cluded this to mean that the General Assembly approves the Suoreme 
Court's liberal rule of construction. In this sense, it could 
be argued that exemptions are granted and denied on the basis 
of judicial determination rather than legislative determination. 
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Duties of Tax Commission 
Chapter 94, Laws of Colorado 1964, requires the Colorado 
Tax Commission to examine and review applications claiming exemp-
tion of real and personal property owned and used sol~ly and ex-
clusively for religious worship, schools, andc:n'aritable purposes. 
If the exemption requested is justified in accordance with law, the 
commission must grant the same. Assessors are prohibited from 
granting exemptions in these areas. However, assessors are respon-
sible for the partial exemptions for parsonages (a maximum of $6,000 
of the valuation for assessment) and public property -- Article X, 
Section 4. 
Procedure. An individual or corporation may file a claim 
for exemption of ad valorem taxes on one of three forms provided 
by the commission -- 1) religious, 2) charitable, or 3) educational. 
These application forms are designed to inform the commission of 
the owner, address, legal descriptionl use, and related financial 
statements concerning the property for which-an exemption is claimed. 
Upon receipt of a claim for exempt status, the commission conducts 
an investigation to substantiate the information contained in the 
application. In other words, the commission must have actual proof 
that the property is used for school, religious, or charitable pur-
poses. Following the investigation of the claim, the commission 
may rule on the taxable status of the property or simply request a 
hearing with the claimant to develop additional information. In 
some instances following an adverse ruling, the claimant or other 
interested party may petition for a redetermination and request a 
hearing before the commission. Appeal of any decision of the com-
mission is made to the district court. 
Claims for Exemptions. Since 1962, 1191 claims for ad val-
orem exemption have been filed with the commission. A brief sum-
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The three classes of property for which the tax commission 
is responsible -- religious, charitable, and educational -- may 
be subdivided into specific categories for purposes of determining 
the types of exemptions granted and denied by the commission. In 
other words, all property owned by a religious organization does 
not automatically qualify for an exemption. The property must be 
utilized solely and exclusivela for religious worship. Therefore, 
the commission reviews each in ividual claim to determine whether 
it merits an exemption under the law. 
Table I lists individual classes of property according to 
use for all claims filed with the commission. Many of these claims, 
once the use has been substantiated, obviously meet the requirements 
of Section 137-2~1, 1965 Permanent Cumulative Supplement to c.R.S. 
1963, relating to exemptions from ad valorem taxes. For instance, 
a church building utilized solely for religious wor·ship certainly 
qualifies for an exemption; similarly, institutions such as the 
Red Cross and Salvation Army also appear to meet the conditions of 
being used solely and exclusively for charitable purposes. However, 
·in many instances the qualifying use·of the property is not clear, 
and the Tax Commission has turned to Colorado court decisions, cases 
in other states, and opinions of the Attorney General in arriving 





AD VALOREM TAX EXEMPTION CLAIMS GRANTED AND DENIED 
BY TAX COMMISSION 1962 - 1965 
Use of Property 
Exem~t 
~rante-
Religious Worship -- Churches, etc. 
Instruction -- Sunday Schools 
Churches -- Under Construction 
Church Sites -- Vacant Land 
Church Parking Lot Religious Only 
Church Parking Lot -- Used Commercial 
poses Weekdays 






Student Centers (College, etc.) 
Housing for Lay Teachers of Church 
Schools 
State Headquarters 
Custodian Lives Rent Free 
Church Playgrounds 
Partial Religious Use 
State Headquarters 
Summer Cottage 
Residences of Secretaries, Lay Assist-
ants, Caretaker (Pays Rent) 
Dormitory of Bible Students 
Vacant Building -- Church Owned 
Income Property of Churches 
Property Used for Religious Purpose but not 
Owned by Church Organization 
















College Summer Camps - Nonresident 
Private High and Grammar Schools (Nonprofit) 
Judo Club 





Placement Center for Private University 





























Use of Property 





Used but not Owned by Lodge 







Staff Residences for Hospitals 
Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc. 
Planned Parenthood 
Residence of Volunteer Social Workers 
Community Centers 
Charitable Foundation 
Summer Camps -- Nonprofit 
Used for Charitable Purposes -- Not Owned 




Senior Citizens' Housing 
Foreign Charities, etc. (Not for Benefit 


































Review of Exempt Properties Granted Prior to 1962 
Subsection 4 of Section 137-3-18, 1965 Permament Cumulative 
Supplement to C.R.S. 1963, requires the commission to annually re-
view the status of all property exempted from ad valorem taxes for' 
religious, school, and charitable purposes and to ascertain whether 
an exemption continues to be justified on individual properties. 
To meet this mandate of the General Assembly, the Tax Commission 
has employed Frank Eggers, an exemption officer, to compile a list-
ing of all private religious, charitable, and school properties in 
Cololorado. The commission expects to complete this survey in 
about three years. 
The Council staff's initial survey on tax exempt property 
revealed that the exempt property records of the assessors were in-
adequate in all but a few instances. The listings of properties 
obtained from the assessors in the Council study were turned over 
to Mr. Eggers, and he is using this information as a starting point 
·in developing information in each county. Eventually, a listing 
of exempt property in each county will enable the assessors to de-
velop detailed maps of all property_ in t_he county showing taxable 
as well as exempt properties. 
In the meantime, the Tax Commission has issued a number of 
circulars to county·assessors to expedite review of exemptions of 
a questionable nature. As early as 1961, prior to the time the 
commission was assigned responsiblility for review of applications 
for ad valorem tax exemptions, the commission issued Circular Num-
ber 2, 1961 Series, pointing out: 
••• The assessor in his official capacity is 
the authority in the determination of whether any 
particular property is exempt under our existing 
laws; if he has any reasonable doubt in the mat-
ter, the property should be properly assessed and 
left in the roll until removed by court action in-
stigated by the taxpayer. 
Chapter 260, Laws of 1961, required the Tax Commission to 
examine periodically all property in this state which has been ex-
empted from taxation; to review applications for all new exemptions; 
and to report to the assessors in writing their decisions. Circu-
lar Number 1, Series of 1962, issued by the commission called the 
assessors' attention to 11 ••• 2) certain properties may have been ex-
empted as being religious, charitable, or school, contrary to the 
opinion of the Assessor. He can and should request that exempt 
status of such property be established by the Tax Commission ••• " 
Similar circulars have been issued in 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966. 
In addition, in discussions with the assessors, the commission has 
repeatedly urged assessors to require owners of exempt property 
(in which there is a question of justification for a~ exemption) 
to file for a redetermination of the exempt status of the property. 
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In some instances, the assessors have followed up on this request 
and have required exempt organizations to submit applications to 
the commission. 
Although the commsssion is authorized to examine indivi-. 
dual tax exemptions in the counties, the commission has elected 
to approach the problem through an over-all survey of the entire 
property exemptions in the county rather than pick on individual 
situations. As the exempt property surv~y is completed in each 
county, the commission will make a redetermination of properties 
within the counties. · 
Review of Selected Areas of Exemption 
Granted and Denied By the Tax Commission 
Senior Citizen Homes. In 1962• Congress enacted the Senior 
Citizens Housing Act (Public Law 87-723). The purpose of the act 
is to assist private nonprofit corporations, consumer cooperatives,· 
or public bodies or agencies to provide .housing and related facil-
ities for elderly or handicapped families. Following enactment of 
Public Law 87-723, a number of charitable, religious, and trade as-
sociations negotiated agreements for the construction of apartment 
houses for the elderly in the urban areas of Colorado. To finance 
the institutions, recipients usually are charged a minimum rental, 
as well as an occupancy fee {$600 - $15,000). The growth in non-
profit senior citizen housing in Colorado in ·the past few years 
has been substantial, and total fixed assets of these homes are 
worth at least $25,000,000. 
Taxable Status. The Colorado Tax Commission has ruled that 
nonprofit housing for the elderly may qualify for an ad valorem 
tax exemption. However, the question has not been resolved since 
litigation is underway in Jefferson County. A basic question exists 
as to whether the residences actually are charitable, especially 
in view of occupancy fees and monthly rental charges. 
In any event, a brief outline of what constitutes a charity 
may reveal the broad scope of charitable exemptions granted in Colo-
ado and other states~ : 
In Bishop and Chapter v. Treasurer, 37 Colo. 378, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court listed a number of opfnions from other jurisdic-
tions defining what constitutes a "charity" or a "charitable purpose." 
In particular, the court includes remarks by Justice Marshall in 
Harrington v. Pier, 82 N.W. 345: 
A general statement of the essentials of a 
charity; as regards the character of the work to 
be performed, will substantially solve the ques-
~ion. It includes everything that is within the 
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letter and spirit of the statute of Elizabeth~ 
considering such spirit to be broad enough to 
include whatever will 1romote, in a legitimate way! the comfort, happ ness and improvement of 
an ndefinite number of persons. To that 
extent, such statute is generally held to be a 
part of the common law of states even that re-
ject all the other features of it.*** The 
general scope of the statue, considering its 
letter and spirit, as before indicated, has 
been judicially stated by judges of great learn-
ing, whose statements have come to be referred 
to generally in judicial opinions as the true 
test rather than the statute itself. The most 
familiar judicial statement of the law, as re-
cognized by the courts, is known as Gray's 
rule, and is found in Jackson v. Phillips, 
14 Allen 539, where the bequest under consider-
ation was for the benefit of (ugitive slaves, 
an object quite remote from any specifically 
mentioned in the English statute. It was held, 
nevertheless, to be within the spirit of the 
statute. After discussing various views of 
the term 'charity,' as applied to charitable 
trusts, Justice Gray said: 'A charity, in the 
legal sense, may be more full! defined as a 
lift to be applied consistent y with existing 
aws, for the benefit of an indefinite number 
of persons, either b! bringing their minds or 
hearts under the inf uence of education or re-
ligion, by relieving their bodies from disease, 
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to 
establish tnemselves in life orb erectin 
or ma ntaining pu lie bui dings or works, or 
otherwise lessening the burdens of government. 
It is immaterial whether the purpose is called 
charitable in the gift itself, if it is so 
described as to show that it is charitable in 
its nature.' Another definition often quoted 
was given by Mr. Binney in the Girard Will 
Case, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205. It is as 
follows: 'Whatever is given for the love of 
God or for the love of your nei~hbor in the 
catholic and universal sense--given from 
these motives and to these ends--free from 
the stain or taint of every consideration 
that is personal, private or selfish.' Perhaps 
a more concise, comprehensive and practical 
definition is that found in Missouri Historical 
Soc. v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 8 S.W. 
346, as follows: 1Any gift, not inconsistent 
with existing laws, which is promotive of science 
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e u 1c convenience is a car wt n e 
meanin~ o e aut orit esf wet er so enom -
nated in the instrument wh ch evidences the ift 
or no. Anot er rue, capa e o eing un er-
stood and applied by any person of ordinary 
understanding, was given by Lord Camden in Jones v. 
Williams, Amb. 652, and approved by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Perin v. Carey 
24 How. 465, 16 L. Ed. 701, as follows: 'A gift 
to a general public usefi which extends to the 
~oor as well as the ric • 1 The theory of that 
is, that the immediate persons benefited may be 
of a particular class and yet, if the use is 
public in the sense tfiat it promotes the ~ener-
al welfare in some way, it has the essentials of 
a charity.» (Emphasis added)' 
2. The ancient statute of Elizabeth. The preamble to the ancient 
statute of Elizabeth (r), sometimes known as the Charitable Uses 
Act, 1601, contained a comprehensive and varied list of charities (s) 
and the statute made it clear that at least those purposes were 
charitable (t). · 
The objects enumerated in the preamble (u) were as follows1 
--The relief of aged, impotent and poor people: the maintenance of 
sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning and free 
schools and scholars of universities; the repair of bridges, ports, 
havens, causeways, churches, sea banks and highways; the education 
and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock or maintenance for 
houses of correction; marriages of poor maids; supportation, aid, 
and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; 
the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; the aid or 
ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting 
out of soldiers, and other taxes. 
The list was not exhaustive (a); but to decide whether a 
purpose is charitable or not in English law, it has since been the 
practice of the courts to refer to the preamble to the ancient 
statute of· Elizabeth (b). The objects there enumerated and all 
others "which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and 
intendment" are charitable in the legal sense (c). No other 
objects are in English law charitable. Those named in the pre-
amble, which has received a very wide construction, are to be 
regarded as instances, and not as the only objects of charity. 
The preamble to the statute of Elizabeth has been expressly pre-
served although the rest of the statute has been repealed. 
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General statements concerning charitable purposes also 
Ire outlined in Corpus Juris Secundum, 84 C.J.s. 544: 
apply to: 
••• Charitable purposes include those the 
accomplishment of which makes it likely that 
persons affected will become substantial and 
useful citizens and less likely that they 
will become burdens on society. Social and 
recreational activities of a club do not consti-
tute a charitable purpose; 
••• purposes purely charitable is broader 
than mere relief of the destitute or the giving 
of· alms; it contemplates activities not self-
supporting which are intended to improve the 
physical, mental, and moral condition of the 
recipients and make it less likely that they 
will become burdens on socie·ty and more likely 
that they will become useful citizens • 
••• In order to be exempt as charitable 
and benevolent, an institution should be oper-
ated without any element of private profit, 
and must not be a money-making institution. 
This does not mean that a charitable institu-
tion cannot charge fees or engage in business, ••• 
According to Black~s Law Dictionary, charity also may mean or 
Accomplishment of some social interest, 
In re Tollinger's Estate, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 
500, 501, 502. Act or feeling of benevolence, 
Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium of 
Tucson v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458. 
Advancement of purposes beneficial to public, 
Rabinowitz v. Wollman, 174 Md. 6, 197 A. 566, 
568. All good affections men ought to bear 
towards each other·. Morice v. Bishop of Dur-
ham, 9 Ves. 399. All which aids man and seeks 
to improve his condition. Waddell v. Young 
Women's Christian Ass'n, 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 
N.E.2d 140, 142. Alms giving, In Re Rathbone's 
Estate, 11 N.Y.S.2d 506, 527, 170 Misc. 1030. 
Amelioration of persons in unfortunate circum-
stances, Second Nat. Bank v. Second Nat. Bank, 
171 Md. 547, 190 A.215, 111 A.L.R. 711. Any 
purpose in which the public has an interest, 
Collins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d 
572, 580. Any purpose of general benefit un-
tainted by motives of private gain. Stearns 
v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 276 
N.Y.S. 390, 395, 154 Misc. 71. Any scheme or 
effort to better the condition of society or any 
considerable part thereof. Tharpe v. Central 
Georgia Council of Boy Scouts of America, 
185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762, 764, 116 A.L.R 373 
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185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762, 764, 116 A.L.R. 373. 
Benefit of an indefinite number of persons, Mor-1an v. National Trust Bank of Charleston, 33r--
11. 182, 162 N.E. 888, 890. Benefit of mini-
ster. In re Edge's Estate, 288 N.Y.S. 437, 440, 
159 Misc. 505. Benevolence, philanthropy, and 
good will. Santa Fe Lodge No. 460 B. P. 0. E. 1 
v. Em~loyment Sec. Commission, 49 ~.M. 149, 159 
P.2d 12, 315. Benevolent or philanthropic, 
Beckwith v. Parish, 69 Ga. 569; Price v. Max-
well, 28 Pa. 23. General Public use which ex-
tends to the rich as well as to the poor. Ham-
ilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Ass'n, 146 
Or. 168, 30 P.2d 9, 14. Gift without considera-
tion or expectation of return, State v. Texas 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Texas, Tex.Civ.App., 51 
S.W.2d 405, 410. Improvement of spiritual, 
mental, social and physical conditions. Andrews 
v. Young Men's Christian Ass~n of Des Moines, 
226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, 192. Le~sening 
burdens of government. Stork v. Schmidt, 129 
Neb. 311, 261 N.W. 552, 554~ Physical, mental 
or moral betterment. In re Tollinger's Estate, 
349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500, 501, 502. Promotion 
of happiness of man. Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Welch, u.C.Mass., 25 F.Supp. 45, 48. Promotion 
of philanthropic and humanitarian purposes. 
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, Mass., 556. 
Promotion of well-doing and well-being of social 
man. Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 
Ill. 356, 19 N.E.2d 193, 199. Public benefit, 
convenience, utility, or comfort, Cam! v. 
Presbgterian Soc. of Sackets Harbor,73 N.Y.S. 
581, 84, 105 Misc. 139. Reclamation of crimi-
nals. Religious, educational, benevolent, and 
humanitarian objects. In re Jordan's Estatef 
329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150. What is done out o 
good will and a desire to add to the improvement 
of moral, mental, and physical welfare of public. 
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, D.C.Mass., 25 
F.Supp. 45, 48. Whatever is given for love of 
God or love of your neighbor, free from every 
consideration that is personal, private, or 
selfish. Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 128, 11 L.Ed. 
205, appr. Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 35. What-
ever proceeds from sense of moral duty or feel-
ing of kindness and humanity for relief or 
comfort of another, Doyle v, Railroad Co,, 118 
Mass. 195, 198, 19 .Am. Rep. 431. 
In summary~ as pointed out in St. John the Evan~eliit v. 
the Treasurer of the City and County of Denver, 37 Colo.78, the 
fact that a person pays for actual necessities, and compensation 
to the institution does not exceed what is required for the success-
ful maintenance of an institution, this does not render it less a 
charity. Of course, the fact that an association is nonprofit also 
does not qualify it for an exemption. 
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The California District Court of Appeals ruled in Fifield 
Manor v. Count of Los An eles (1961) 10 Cal. Reporter 242, that 
nonpro corpora ons were entitled to property tax exemption for 
property devoted to homes for the aged, although occupied mainly 
by middle income persons who had been self-employed, and where 
charges did not yield more than actual costs. The court concluded: 
The courts have long recognized and declared 
that charity is not limited to giving alms, is 
not confined to relief of the poor, may extend 
to the rich in areas where they are not able to 
care for themselves, and extends to those social 
objectives which promote the general welfare .and 
would be served by the government in the absence 
of philanthropic enterprises such as homes for 
the aged. Historically, and well-nigh unani-
mously, the courts have found homes for the aged 
to be charitable institutions where conducted at 
cost or less. They have also recognized that 
man, especially the old, does not live by bread 
alone; that though he be able to pay for all 
material wants he nevertheless may be dependent 
upon his fellow man or the government to pro-
tect him from the haunting fear of loss of all 
his property with resultant poverty, fear of ill-
ness or other physical disability overtaking him 
with no one near to help, fear of the loneliness 
arising from absence of social contacts, fear of 
any of the tragedies of old age where there is 
no one standing by to help. 
The test is not found in the question of 
what financial ability does the recipient possess, 
but what are his needs, alleviation of which con-
stitutes a worthy social value. We apprehend 
that the financial test becomes pertinent only 
when the occupants of an old age home pay more 
than the cost to the home of what it furnishes 
them. 
(1) In the light of these authorities 
it seems clear that a home for the aged which 
caters to wealthy persons and furnishes them 
those services and care needed by the old and 
infirm, rich or poor, does not cease to be a 
charitable institution so long as its charges 
do not yield more than actual cost of opera-
tion; that it does cease to have that status 
when the occupants pay more than the cost to 
the home, thus resulting in a profit and con-
verting it into a non-charitable institution. 
Attorney General's Opinions. In 1959, Donald Kelley, 
City Attorney for Denver, requested an opinion from the Attorney 
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General on the taxable status of the Campbell-Stone Memorial 
Residence (Memo No. 59 - 3341). Excerpts from Mr. Dunbar's reply 
follow: 
The Association of Christian Churches of 
the Denver Area, Inc., is the owner of what is 
known as Campbell-Stone Memorial Residence, 
located at 1285 Race Street, Denver. The 
Association formally requested the Assessor 
that its property, land and improvements be 
given tax exemption from ad valorem taxes un-
der Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. '53 and Sec. 5, 
Article X of the Constitution. Such request 
was denied by the Assessor and the matter is 
currently pending before the Board of Equaliza-
tion. 
The facts upon which request for exemp-
tion was based appear to be~-
The Association has made improvements 
on the land which consists of a modern apart-
ment building containing a·total of sixty-
five resident units varying between buffet 
units, one bed room units and two bed room 
units, together with a recreation room, sun 
deck and sick-bay. The same is licensed by 
the Department of Health and Hospitals of 
Denver as an Institution for the Aged. The 
units are leased only to physically able 
senior citizens, who are approved by an ad-
missions committee; and who pay an occupancy 
fee of $600.00 (refundable on death or re-
moval) and fixed monthly rentals of $48.00 
for buffet units; $65.00 for one bed room 
apartments; and $80.00 for two bed room 
apartments. The tenancy is terminated upon 
non-payment of the agreed rental, except 
that the Association states that it has estab-
lished a fund, arising from voluntary contri-
butions, from which rentals due from occupants 
who are without funds is paid. The rentals 
charged are admittedly lower than the prevail-
ing rental scale of like units. 
The Association has filed with the FHA, 
from whom a loan was obtained, a letter obligat-
ing it to assume and pay any deficit between 
income and operating expense arising out of 
the operation of said housing project. 
Cl.JESTION: Under these facts does Sec. 
5, Article X of the Colorado Constitution 
and Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. '53 exempt this 
property from ad valorem taxation? 
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ANSWER: Under the facts as outlined in 
your letter of October 26, and after an examina-
tion of the decisions applicable thereto it is 
my opinion that there is ample authority and 
grounds to support a judicial determination 
in favor of a tax exempt status under Sec. 137-
12-3(3), C.R.S. 1963, and Sec. 5, Article X of 
the Constitution. 
More detailed facts relating to the opera-
tion of the Campbell-Stone Memorial Residence, 
appearing in a brief submitted on the question 
indicates that the residence is operated as a 
non-profit charitable and.benevolent enter-
prise of the Association. The Association, a 
Colorado corporation, was issued a corporate 
charter in 1946, as a religious and benevolent 
society or association and is not organized 
for profit and has no stockholders. 
From Kem~ v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41, 
decided in 19 3, we find the following: 
"While the use of the property, and not 
the character of the owner, is the test of 
the right to exemption, the character of the 
owner sheds an important side light on the 
nature of the use." 
In Lutheran Hospital Association v. Baker 
(1918), 40 S.D. 226, 167 N.W. 148, it was said: 
"The determination of the exemption in 
a particular case seems to depend in the last 
analysis, upon two things 
First, whether the organization claiming 
the exemption is a charitable one; and, second, 
whether the property on which the exemption is 
claimed is being devoted to charitable purposes. 
In general, it may be said that any body not 
organized for profit, which has for its purpose 
the promotion of the general welfare of the 
public, extending its benefits without discrimi-
nation as to race, color or creed, is a charita-
ble or benevolent organization within the 
meaning of the tax exemption statutes." 
We note further that "the courts are 
agreed that a charitable institution does not 
lose its charitable character and its consequent 
exemption from taxation merely because recipients 
of its benefits who are able to pay are required 
to do so, where funds derived in this manner 
are devoted to the charitable purpose of the 
institution." Hot Springs School Dist. vs. 
Sisters of Mercy (1907), 84 Ark. 497, 106 s.w. 
954. 
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From the case The Bishop and Chapter of the 
Cathedral of St. John the Evantelist v. The 
Treasurer of the Cit~ and Coun y of Denver, 37 
Colo. 378, 86 Pac. I 21, we have the"following: 
"The only question, therefore, presented 
for our consideration is, whether the exaction 
of payment from the patients for the actual 
necessities furnished, according t~ their cir-
cumstances and the accommodations they receive, 
constituted a use of the buildings other than 
a strictly charitable one. We think that it 
has been uniformly held that, when such com-
pensation does not exceed what is required for 
the successful maintenance of the institution, 
it does not render it less a charity." 
The "Home" requires that its tenants pay 
only a portion of their keep if they are finan-
cially able, and if they are not able to pay, 
money is received from member churches as dona-
tions to carry on the work ·of the home and to 
pay for those who are unable to pay. 
From the alleged facts submitted in your 
letter it appears that the residents of Campbell-
Stone Memorial Residence, are all and may have 
been for many years, residents of the State of 
Colorado. 
The "residence" meets the requirements for 
tax exemption in the following respects:-
(1) A Colorado corporation organized as 
a religious and benevolent non-profit enter-
prise, whose membership consists of the Asso-
ciation of Christian Churches of Denver. 
(2) Furnishes a home for senior citizens, 
at less expense to the resident of the home than 
could be purchased elsewhere, any deficit being 
made up from donations and contributions from 
member churches. 
(3) Result: The Campbell-Stone Memorial 
Residence by its operation and care of senior 
citizens is thereby relieving the taxpayers of 
Colorado of the expense of caring for those 
elder citizens who otherwise might sooner or 
later become a charge upon the State for their 
care and support. 
The Attorney General issued a similar opinion in December 
of 1960 -- 60-3464: 
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Rocky Mountain Methodist Homes, Incorporated 
is a not for profit Colorado corporation and owns 
certain real estate in Boulder County and has con-
structed improvements, thereon at a cost, includ-
ing cost of furnishings, of about $1,920,Q00.00. 
The Boulder County Assessor proposes to assess 
the improvements and land. The corporation 
claims that this assessment is erroneous since 
the lands and improvements are exempt from taxa-
tion under the provi~ions of Section 5, Article 
X of the Colorado Constitution and Section 137-12-3, 
1953 C.R.S. 
The property is operated under the name Fra-
sier Meadows Manor. The home is operated as a 
home for elderly persons and is a project of The 
Rocky Mountain Conference of the Methodist Church, 
which Conference is the governing body of the 
church for the States of Colorado, Wyoming and 
Utah. The charter provides that the home is to 
be a home for members or ministers of the Metho-
dist Church and for older persons of good moral 
character ••• 
For those who have sufficient funds a contri-
bution is made depending upon the accomodations 
desired. The accommodations vary from a single 
unit at $8,000 to $18,000 for an apartment facing 
the mountains. For this payment the accommoda-
tions are available for life. The units are 
leased only to physically able senior citizens. 
The monthly care and food charge is $125.00 per 
month. The corporation agrees to care for a per-
son on basis of old age assistance should funds 
become exhausted. The corporation also provides 
for special occupancy cases where people do not 
have sufficient funds to pay the $8,000. These 
contributions have varied from $25.00 to $1500. 
Seven persons have been admitted as special occu-
pancy cases and the total contribution for the 
seven is $4,525 or an average of approximately 
$650.00 each. 
There is no fixed rule by which it can be 
determined whether an organization is a charitable 
one. Each case must turn on its particular facts. 
It appears that Frasier Meadows and Campbell-
Stone are similar in organization and purpose 
with the exception that Frasier Meadows requires 
a much larger occupancy fee ($8,000 - $18,000} 
than Campbell-Stone ($600.00}. Frasier Meadows 
charges $125 per month for the room, heat, light, 
water, board, periodic room service and flat 
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laundry service. Campbell-Stone makes a fixed 
monthly rental of $48.00 - $80.00 with no pro-
vision for board. 
It is my opinion that there is sufficient 
similarity in the Frasier Meadows home compared 
to the Campbell-Stone home to justify a judicial 
determination in favor of a tax exempt status 
under Sec. 137-12-3(8), C.R.S. 1953, and Sec. 5, 
Article X of the Constitution. 
In a letter to the Attorney General in January of 1963, 
Howard Latting, chairman of the Tax Commission, also outlined problems 
.posed by senior citizen homes. 
As you are undoubtedly aware, Congress autho-
rized F. H. A. financing of Senior Citizen Homes, 
provided they were sponsored by certain types of 
non-profit organizations. 
In Colorado, such homes have been and are 
in the process of being sponsored by churches, 
church organizations, hospital associations, 
and labor unions. Inasmuch as F. H. A. does 
not provide one-hundred per cent financing, 
second mortgages are necessary. If a Senior 
Citizen wishes to avail himself, or herself, 
of one of these apartments, he or she must pay 
an entrance fee, plus a monthly rental. 
The entrance fees will vary from $600 to 
$7,500 generally, and the monthly rental will 
vary from $60 per month to $135 per month gen-
erally. The entrance fee is geared primarily 
to service the second mortgage, and the monthly 
rentals are established after approval by F. H. A. 
to service the F. H. A. loan. Thus, it would 
appear, that the amount of money necessary to 
provide Senior Citizen housing is provided by 
the Senior Citizens themselves, and NOT by the 
sponsoring organization; in other words, they 
are self-sustaining. 
At the present time, we are in receipt of 
three separate applications for tax exemption 
under C.R. S. 1953, 137-12-3(8) filed with us 




Association of Christian Churches (Campbell-
Stone) 
Broadway Baptist Housin9, Incorporated 
(Roger-Williams Manor) 
Central Housing, Incorporated (Cane-
Ridge Manor) 
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There is no doubt in our mind that such projects 
are commendable, however, there is some doubt as 
to their eligibility for exemption under strict 
interpretation of applicable statutes. Also, be-
cause this is a new concept, there is some ques-
tion as to whether or not the matter should be 
determined by litigation, rather than by administra-
tive decision. 
In answer to Mr. Latting, the Attorney General stated: 
We have examined the papers submitted by the 
Broadway Baptist Housing, Incorporated (Ro~er-
Williams Manor), Central Housing, incorporated 
(Cane-Ridge Manor), and Presbyterian Hospital 
Association (Park Manor), respecting their 
claims for tax exemption under 137-12-3(8) CRS 
'53 as amended, and we do not see where these 
organizations and their operations differ in 
principle from the Association of Christian 
Churches of the Denver Area, Inc .• , which oper-
ates Campbell-Stone, which was the subject of 
our Opinion No. 59-3341 which you have, or 
Frasier Meadows Manor owned by Rocky Mountain 
Methodist Homes, Inc., which was the subject of 
our Opinion No. 60-3464 which you also have. 
We have also read the case of Fifield Manor, 
and others, v. the County of Los Angeles · 
decided by the District Court of Appeal of the 
Second 9istrict of California on January 3, 
1961 as modified on January 31, 1961. From 
this case and the other cases which we cited 
in our Opinions No. 59-4331, 59-3346, and 60-
3464 it is still our opinion that there is 
ample authority to justify you in determining 
that all of the above institutions are exempt 
from ad valorem taxes under Section 137-12-3(8) 
CRS '53 as amended. 
Based on opinions of the Attorney General and Court deci-
sions in Colorado and other states, the commission has approved the 
concept of an ad valorem tax exemption for nonprofit senior citizen 
homes. 
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Churches Under Construction 
In viewing the records of the Tax Commission, a number 
of religious organizations have filed for exemption of church 
buildings under construction. If the investigation of the property 
by the commission, staff, or county assessor reveals that a church 
actually is under construction the exemption is granted. The com-
mission's decision is based on Supreme Court cases utilizing a 
"liberal rule" of interpretation of Article X, Section 5, of the 
Colorado Constitution and the relative statutes. It is interesting 
to note, however, that Supreme Court members have disagreed over 
the application of the so-called "liberal rule" of construction. 
The depression of the l930's apparently was an important 
factor in bringing this problem to the attention of the court as 
well as being a factor in the liberal decisions of the court. The 
issue of a tax exemption for churches under construction came before 
the courts because there were lengthy periods during the depression 
in which churches lacked finances to complete .their building activi-
ties. · 
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For instance, in El Jebel Shrine Association v. McGlone 
(1933), 93 C.334, the court stated: 
••• a sufficient answer is that at the cost 
of about $50,000 a cellar has been excavated 
upon their premises and stone walls thereon_ 
erected upon which the super-structure of a 
building will be erected as soon as business 
conditions permit. Counsel for the county 
treasurer evidently construes our constitu-
tional and statutory provisions in question 
as requiring a building to be entirely com-
pleted before the same can escape taxation. 
There are a number of decisions in other juris-
dictions to the contrary. A structure is a 
building under the arson statute, although it. 
is yet incomplete and unfinished. Commonwealth 
v. Squire, 42 Mass. (1 Mete.), 258, 259. In 
Scott v. Goldinghorst, 123 Ind. 268, 24 N.E. 
333, the word "building" under the mechanic's 
lien law does not mean a completed building ••• 
It would seem therefore, that the foundation 
which the shrine association has made, or 
caused to be made, upon these premises is a 
building, at least a part of building •••• In 
New England Hosp. v. Boston, 113 Mass. 518, ••• 
The court in that case said that inasmuch as 
this admittedly charitable institution had 
purchased the lots for the purpose of erecting 
the building thereon, and was proceeding with 
the preliminary measures necessary for its 
erection, the land must be deemed to be occupied 
for the charitable purposes for which the hospi-
tal was incorporated and was therefore exempt ••• 
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In the Shrine case, the court upheld the premise that an unfinished 
structure is in fact a building and entitled to exemption. 
This liberal construction was carried one step further in 
a majority opinion of the Supreme Court in McGlone v. First Baptist 
Church (1935), 97 Colo. 427. A religious organization razed a resi-
dence and garages for the purpose of construction of a church. At 
the time of assessment the land had been cleared and was vacant, but 
actual construction had not commenced. However, the court held that 
clearing of the land was sufficient evidence of intent to build 
a church and granted the exemption. Ex~erpts from the majority 
opinion of the court follow: J 
••• In a recent case this court said: 11 The 
courts of some of the states interpret such pro-
visions strictly and others liberally. Our own 
decisions unquestionably are liberal*** The 
argument of counsel for the defendants in error, 
which, in substance, is a plea for the adoption 
by this court of the strict 'rule of construction, 
which if approved, would be contrary to our pre-
vious decisions on this important subject, does 
not meet with our approval, .•• " 
••• The statute with reference to exemptions 
is practically in the same words as the constitu-
tional provision. It has not been materially 
changed over a course of many years, from which 
fact it seems logical to conclude that the people 
of the state have approved the liberal rule of 
construction adopted by the courts; otherwise 
they would have taken action through the legisla-
ture to further limit the conditions under which 
property of religious, charitable and educational 
institutions may be exempt • 
••• Based on the El Jebel Association v. McGlone, 
Supra, in which the court held that a foundation 
was sufficient to qualify as a building, the major-
ity opinion stated: "There was no contention in 
that case, and could be none in reason that the 
foundation, which is all there was on the lot, was 
used for strictly charitable purposes. Indeed 
there was no contention that it was used at all." 
The rule of construction that we applied in the 
Shrine case was substantially this: When an ad-
mittedly charitable institution undertakes in 
good faith to extend its land and facilities for 
charitable work and evidences this fact by the 
expenditure of money and the doing of work as 
part of a program looking toward the erection of 
a building to be used when completed for charitable 
purposes, this is within the spirit of the consti-
tutional and statutory tax exemption provisions ••• 
In effect we hold that the requirements of the 
constitution and statutes are met if there is 
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a bona fide continuing intention to construct a 
building to be devoted to the specified uses, 
evidenced by work and the expenditure of money 
toward that end. 
In the instant case, the court contended: 
"It began work on the lots by removing a nine-
teen room house and nine or ten garages located 
thereon and had completed this work only five 
months before the assessment of which complaint 
was made, work that was a prerequisite to build-
ing a church and a part of the building program, 
just as putting in a foundation was a part of 
the Shrine program." 
On the other hand, in a minority opinion, Justice Holland 
dissented. In part, he said: 
••• can liberal construttion go so far as to 
bring into physical existence a building, or some 
part of a building on a lot, when admittedly 
there is none? ••• The Constitution clearly says 
••• and does not say that the intention to con-
struct a building to be used for religious wor-
ship exempts th.e real estate upon which it is to 
be located, from taxation •••• If there was even 
a doubt as to the meaning of the wording of the 
constitution and statute applicable to the case 
and it became necessary to indulge a presumption 
relative to the meaning of the words employed, 
the presumption is always in favor of the taxing 
power. 61 C.J. 391, Section 395. 
Chief Justice Butler concurred in the dissent. 
Nonresident Activities 
The Tax Commission has held that the property of a geology 
summer camp for students of an out-of-state university must be placed 
on the tax rolls. Similarly, the commission has determined that pro-
perty used for other religious, charitable, and education activities 
primarily for the benefit of nonresidents of Colorado may not qualify 
for a tax exemption. In The Youn Life Cam ai n A Cor oration 
Board of County Commissioners o Ca ee County, et a. 95 
Colo. 15, the Supreme Court contended: 
••• It would unduly prolong this opinion to 
quote from other decisions which support our con-
clusion that it was not the intention of the 
people of the state of Colorado by adoption of 
its constitutional provision (Article X, Section 
5) or by legislative act to relieve a nonprofit 
foreign corporation, be it charitable, religious 
or educational, of the payment of its general 
taxes and thereby increase the tax burden upon 
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its resident taxpayers where, as here, said 
foreign corporation cannot fairly be said to 
ease any of the burdens of the taxpayers of 
the state of Colorado ••• 
••• While it is the policy of society to 
encourage education, benevolence and charity, 
we do not believe it to be a proper function 
of the state to go outside its own borders 
and devote its resources to the support of 
education, religion and charity for the bene-
fit of the human race. Such would be a 
direct diversion of the state's resources at 
the expense of its resident taxpayers ••• 
We hold that a resident or nonresident, 
nonprofit educational, religious, and charita-
ble corporation which is not using its property 
in the state for the benefit of the people of 
Colorado is not exempt~from the payment of 
general taxes on property held by it' within 
this state. 
Fraternal Lodges 
Although fraternal organizations organized for charitable 
purposes are eligible for exempt status under rulings of the Tax 
Commission, the commission has excluded clubs organized for social 
purpose from qualifying for tax exemptions. For instance, if the 
by-laws of an organization emphasize charity and social activities 
are of secondary importance -- Elks, Masonic Lodges, etc. -- the 
organization may qualify for an exemption. On the other hand, if 
the social aspects are of utmost importance, the exempt status is 
denied. 
Many tax exempt fraternal organizations utilize exempt 
facilities for various social gatherings and because of this their 
exempt status has been questioned. In Horton v. Colorado Springs 
Masonic Building Society (1918) 64, Colorado 529, the court stated: 
The fact that these societies or their mem-
bers sometimes give a dinner or a dance in the 
reception and other rooms ••• in our opinion, 
does not change the nature of the use of the 
building •••• when a religious organization 
serves a meal or lap supper in the basement 
of its church, and charges for it, even for 
purposes of raising money to meet a deficiency 
in connection with its church matters, or to 
be used in religious work, no authority has 
every held that for that reason the church 
building was not used solely and exclusively 
for religious worshtp. The aims and objects 
of these societies are charitable. The moneys 
received from their members and otherwise, 
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except sufficient to perpetuate their existence, 
are devoted to charitable purposes; ••• 
••• The reading rooms, etc., in connection 
with the lodge rooms, make them all the more 
attractive and tend to increase the membership, 
which in turn gives greater opportunity to 
enlarge the charities performed. The dances 
and dinners referred to are but an incident in 
the social life of these societies; they are 
not for gain or profit, although they may, in 
so~ instances, add to the revenue and in the 
end help to provide more funds to be used by 
the societies in their charity work. 
Cases holding that property used princi-
pally for the benefit only of persons in some 
way related to the members of a society (an 
artifical class as it is called) are not ex-
empt have done so generally for the .reason 
that the constitution or statute governing 
the case provided that the ~har1ty shall be 
a purely public charity •••• These cases are 
not applicable to the question under considera-
tion. Our constitution does not contain the 
word "public" in connection with "strictly 
charitable purposes. 11 (.Emphasis Added) 
I 
Dissenting Opinion. Mr. Justice Teller wrote a dissenting 
opinion in the Horton v. Masonic Society case: 
••• First, the decisions cited as committing 
us to the rule of liberal construction do not 
determine that such rule should be generally 
applied in this jurisdiction, but only that the 
•• irule should be modified as to the schools; ••• 
••• This affords no possible ground for 
holding that the first floor of the so-called 
Masonic Temple is exempt. The construction 
there applied was, as the opinion states, 
necessary to prevent a limitation of the exemp-
tion to the things which are absolutely indis-
pensable to a school, and thus interfere with 
its work. If is be supposed that a clubhouse 
or social hall is indispensable to the main 
purpose for which the Masonic lodges are con-
stituted and property acquired, it is pertinent 
to inquire why the great majority of lodges 
have not and never have had club rooms annexed 
to them? 
••• Conceding, now, that by weight of 
authority Masonic lodges are charitable insti-
tutions, and that the property used for strictly 
-33-
lodge purposes should be exempt from taxation, 
it by no means follows that all of the property 
here involved is entitled to such exemption. 
How can it be said that the use of so much of 
this property as is in effect a clubroom for 
the use of lodge members -- with no necesaary 
connection with the general work of the order, 
relieves the state of any burden. 
Under a simple social organization, with 
a rapid increase of wealth and tax-paying power, 
the question of exemptions was not of very great 
importance; but, with increased complexity of 
so~ial and political relations, and consequent 
increase of public expenditures, it becomes 
more and more necessary to widen the field of 
taxation so as to equalize the burdens of 
government. 
It is clear that use of part of. the building 
for noncharitable purposes puts that much of the 
property in competition with all persons who 
have property to rent for similar purposes. 
Were the first floor of the building not used 
for social purposes, the parties not thus using 
it, must if they would have a clubroom, either 
buy or lease other prope.rty which pays taxes. 
No one would claim that property, used as is the 
first floor of the building in question, and 
separate from the building containing the lodge 
rooms, would be exempt. That being so, it is 
evident that the only ground of exemption is 
its physical connection with the lodge rooms. 
It cannot be said that the people, who frequent 
the rooms on the first floor and enjoy its 
privileges, are objects of charity. Doubtless, 
they would resent such an imputation. Yet, if 
as to them the first floor is not devoted to 
charitable uses, it is not so used at all. 
The court also approved the liberal rule of constructio~ 
of Count Commissioners of Rio Grande Count Et al v: 
a ef Masonic Association 926 , 8 Coo. 8 • xcerpts 
case ollow: 
••• that plaintiff is the owner of 160 acres 
of land in Rio Grande County, which tract is com~ 
monly known and designated as "Masonic Park" on 
which are located three buildings ••• all owned by 
the plaintiff and used for masonic purposes, 
including fraternal, pleasure, and recreation; 
••• It is admitted that the plaintiff's. 
articles of incorporation provide, inter alia, 
that the business and object for which the 
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association was formed was to promote social 
intercourse among themselves and associates, 
and to acquire, hold, and convey real estate 
and personal property, to borrow money for 
the purposes of improving their property and 
to have and maintain in the county of Rio 
Grande, for the use of themselves and other 
associates for the purpose mentioned, an 
association or club house with all the appur-
tenances and belongings, and matters and things 
of a club or association, as usual thereto. 
Defendants contentions are that the use 
of the property is not for strictly charitable 
purposes; that ownership of the land has nothing 
to do with the question under consideration; 
that whether it is exempt from or subject to 
taxation depends upon the use of the land and 
the buildings thereon, and that the admitted 
facts show that they are used for residence 
or recreation purposes. · 
While the use of a ti~ct of land or park 
with buildings thereon for strictly charitable 
purposes may be unusual and out of the ordinary, 
we know of no reason why they may not be so 
used. In the Horton case, supra, we held that 
the buildings and grounds were exempt from taxa-
tion, although the proof disclosed that the 
first floor contained a reading room, a smok-
ing and reception room, and another large room 
sometimes used in connection with the others 
for dinners and dances given by members of the 
different bodies; that sometimes entertainments 
were restricted to members and other times non-
members were included, and that the society 
maintained in the building a ciqar stand for 
the sale of cigars, tobacco, and other things 
to those privileged to be there. It further 
appeared in that case that pl~intiff rented 
the property t~ certain Masonic organizations 
who were stockholders of the plaintiff in that 
case. 
Following the rule of liberal construction 
adopted in this jurisdiction, it seems quite 
clear that the property in question was exempt 
from taxation. From the admitted facts, it 
seems plain that the property was used strictly 
for charitable purposes within the spirit and 
meaning of the Constitution and statutes. 
We think the principles announced in the 
Horton case, supra, are applicable to the 
facts in the instant case, and because the facts 
!n that case were so thoroughly considered and 
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the numerous authorities cited and reviewed, 
we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the 
matter here. We are of the opinion that the 
mere selling of leasehold interests to Masonic 
purchasers of certain lots of plaintiff's land, 
upon which they erect their own buildings and 
for their own use, is not sufficient to take 
from plaintiff's property its exempt character. 
Denial of Exemption to Social Organizations and Labor Unions 
In at least four situations, the Tax Commission has denied 
exemptions to social clubs~- Polish Club and Slavic Club for exam-
ples •. The commission after a review of the by-laws of these organiza-
tions has refused to grant tax exempt status on the grounds that 
their charitable activities are only incidental to their social pro-
grams. Supporting the determination of the commission is the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's ruling in Denver Press Club v. Collins (1932), 
92 Colo. 74. An excerpt from this case follows: 
The sole and only question presented for 
our determination is whether, under the facts 
herein, the property of this plaintiff is ex-
empt from taxation as being used solely and 
exclusively for strictly charitable purposes • 
.•• We have read the deci$ions and studiously 
considered the entire records in those cases, 
and do not belive that, under them, plaintiff 
is exempt •••• The evidence offered herein 
definitely establishes that plaintiff is a 
social organization, and that any charitable 
work done is incidental to the principal ob-
ject for which the club is organized. The 
fact that plaintiff's members, as individuals, 
are public spirited enough to assist in raisirg 
funds for strictly charitable organizations 
does not inure to the benefit of_ the plain-
tiff, and does not make plaintiff a charitable 
organization within the purview of our Consti-
tution. 
A review of the tax exempt records of the City and County of 
Denver reveal that the Denver Press Club and the Denver Woman's Press 
Club currently are exempt. It must be emphasized that current cri-
teria for granting an exemption is that an association is organized 
for charitable purposes. Those exemptions have not been reviewed 
by the commission. 
The Supreme Court also ruled against tax exemptions for 
labor unions. In Lane v. Wilson (1938}, 103 Colo. 99, the court 
held that: 
••• we still adhere to the distinction 
between a charity, and a beneficial society 
whose beneficience is confined to the members, 
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their families, dependents or friends, and de-
pends upon the contributions made, not voluntarily 
given, but assessed against the members. s~ch an 
organization, we have described as "not a charity, 
but a private institution for the mutual advantage 
of the members." 
Physical Training Clubs 
It is interesting to note that the Denver Turnverein (ath-
letic club) was granted an exemption by the Supreme Court on the 
grounds that it is an educational institution -- Denver Turnverein 
v. McGlone (1932), 91 Colo. 473, 15 P. 2d 709. The Turnverein ls 
-Interested in promoting physical and mental qualities of its members. 
In part, the opinion of the court states: 
••• corporation not for profit; that it owns 
lots in Denver on which ther~ is a one story 
building and basement, equipped with gymnastic 
apparatus, ••• its purpose, to which it conforms, 
are to promote the physical and mental qualities 
of its members and others who may comply with its 
rules, ••• and whatever may be incidental thereto, 
and to extend a charitable hand to those in need; 
that its doors are never guarded and all well-
behaved persons, regardless of race or creed, 
are welcomed to its classes and its charities, 
not restricted to its membership, are as ex~ 
tensive as its funds will admit •••• It does 
not appear that its members, or their dependents 
or descendents, as such, have any claim to, or 
right in, any of its funds, ••• 
We think that notwithstanding plaintiff's 
charities are althgether worthy, its primary 
objective may fairly be said to be educational • 
••• In the case of Bishop of the Cathedral of 
St. John v. County Treasurer, 29 Colo. 143, 68 
Pac. 272, ••• Mr. Justice Gabbert concluded 
provisions exempting property used for educa-
tional purposes are less strictly construed than 
those exempting property used for ordinary gain 
or profit •••• The court concluded that only a 
narrow construction, doing violence to the in-
tent of the people and legislature with respect 
to, not to be indulged, would operate to defeat 
the claim for exemption, ••• 
We conclude on the facts here that the 
plaintiff is conducting an educational institu-
tion worthy of encouragement, and one coming 
within the reasonable purview of the law making 
property, such as it owns, and used as appears, 
exempt from taxation. As we have seen, the 
plaintiff emphasizes and teaches physical culture, 
held generally to be an important element in 
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educational development. As was said in Mt. 
Herman Bo~s• School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139, 
146 N.E.54: "Education may be particularly 
directed to either the mental, moral, or physi-
cal powers and faculties, but in its broadest 
and best sense it relates to them all." 
••. If three institutions are organized --
one seeking by a course of instruction to culti-
vate the mind, one by a method of instruction 
to improve students' religious or moral condi-
tions, and another to teach physical culture to 
produce a better physical development, each 
is an institution of education, as much as the 
one at which the student can acquire the three-
fold knowledge. It is simply a matter of judg-
ment or convenience, whether one shall furnish 
all the opportunities for the acquisition of 
an education or whether there shall be separate 
institutions for that purpose ••• 
Following the Turnverein case the General Assembly enacted 
legislation clarifying what may be considered a school. At the 
time of the Turnverein case, .the law listing properties qualifying 
foi exemption provided: 
••• grounds with buildings thereon, if said 
buildings are used exclu~ively for schools, 
other than schools held or conducted for private 
or corporate profit. (Laws of 1921, page 687). 
The law was amended in 1933 to provide: 
(3) The property real and personal, that is 
held exclusively for schools other than schools 
held or conducted for private or corporate pro-
fit. School is hereby defined to mean an educa-
tional institution requiring daily attendance, 
having a curriculum comparable to a grade, gram-
mar school, junior high, high school or college 
or any combination thereof and having an enroll-
ment of at least forty students and charging a 
tuition fee. 
Although it would appear that statutory amendments subse-
quent to the Turnverein decision negate this decision,. Webster's 
New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, points 
out that in the usual sense-curriculum mean~: 
The whole body of courses offered in an 
educational institution, or by a department 
thereof. On the other hand, strictly speaking, 
curriculum means "A course; especially, a speci-
fied fixed course of study, as in a school or 
college, a~ one leading to a degree." 
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Under the aforementioned definition schools or other nonprofit organi-
zations offering individual courses could qualify for tax exemptions. 
For-this reason the Denver Judo Club, the Westernaires (Jefferson 
County Saddle Club), the American Institute of Banking, etc., were 
granted tax exemptions by the commission. 
Parking Facilities 
The Supreme Court's liberal rule of construction as empha-
sized in the preceding paragraphs again suggests that the use of 
parking facilities for; church services is essential to the present 
day conduct of a religious program. As long as the parking lots 
are used solely and exclusively for religious services the exemption 
'is granted. However, if the parking lot is leased on weekdays for 
commercial parking the exemption is lost. 
Perhaps a Supreme Court case that best illustrates the 
concept of the liberal rule of construction as applied to the exemp-
tion of property directly related to the principle function for 
which the exemption is granted is Horton v. Fountain Valley School 
(1936), 98 Colo. 480. -
In this instance, the Court stated: 
••• There is no contention that the school 
here concerned does not come within the above 
statutory definition, and the trial court appar-
ently so found; also that acreage or ·grounds to 
the extent of approximately 175 acres were used 
in connection with the operation of the school 
and therefore exempt. In arriving at this con-
clusion, the trial court necessarily had to, 
and did, determine that the school was not held 
or conducted for private or corporate profit. 
On each of these questions the court's finding 
is amply supported by the evidence and there-
fore will not be disturbed. 
Having affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court to this end, it is needless to discuss 
the question of the exemption or taxability of 
the residue of the land, other than to deter-
mine whether or not it is used in connection 
with the school as such. There is no constitu-
tional limitation as to the number of lots that 
may be held by schools; neither is there any 
statutory limitation as to the extent of grounds, 
as such term is used in the statute, that may 
be used in connection with schools • 
••• in Bishop, etc. v. Treasurer, 29 Colo. 
143, 68 Pac. 272, if the use of property utilized 
for a school is limited to that which is indis-
pensable for this purpose, the extent to which 
institutions of this character are benefited 
by exemption from taxation is confined to the 
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narrowest possible limits, and every use which 
could be dispensed with and yet permit a school 
to be conducted which might be so termed in 
name, would subject the property so used to 
taxation. Such a co~struction would be too 
narrow, and fall far short of expressing the 
intent of the people and legislature with res-
pect to schools. The fundamental object of 
the law was to exempt property used for school 
purposes from taxation. . .. the uses permissible 
must necessarily embrace all which are proper 
and appropriate to effect the objects of the 
institution claiming the benefits of the exemp-
tion ••.• The constitutions and statutes mention 
no particular or specific character of use, and 
all requirements are met if a use is for the 
purposes fostered for exemption. The taxing 
authorities admit a use by c-0ntending that the 
use is insignificant. It is not for them to 
measure a use. Neither is it for them to con-
jecture whether or not the _institution might 
at some time become a profit-making enterprize ••. 
The school, to obtain exemption for present use, 
was not required to allege further. If a pecuni-
ary benefit is ever derived from a profit result-
ing from the operation of the school, a violation 
of its charter then would be imminent .•• 
Vacant Lands 
The Tax Commission has consistently denied granting tax 
exempt status to vacant lands owned by religious and charitable 
institutions. In many instances, religious organizations have 
obtained a site for a church and filed for an exemption with the 
Tax Commission. Although the land has been purchased for the 
location of a church or charitable building and architects plans 
have been filed, etc., for construction of the building, the Tax 
Commission still has denied exemption. 
The commission's position has been substantiated by the 
Supreme Court in Denver v. George Washington Lodge Association (1950), 
121 Colo. 470. In this instance, the court commented on the tradi-
tional liberal interpretation of the Constitution that the court has 
held concerning tax exempt property, pointing out that churches or 
charitable buildings under construction have been held to be tax 
exempt. However the Supreme Court could not concur in an exemption 
granted for vacant property in which a building is to be constructed 
at a future date. In part, the court stated: 
.•. In the present case, we are asked to go 
one step further and hold that the mere purchase 
under contract of a vacant property, with general 
intent at some future date to erect thereon a 
building to be used for a charitable purpose, 
would, by some legal fiction, create both a 
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building and establish its present use for a 
strictly charitable purpose. It is not surpris-
ing, in view of the former decisions of this 
court, that the trial court so held. However, a 
departure is nonetheless a departure because it 
is made step by step, and it appears high time 
for this court to determine, ·not merely how far 
we have departed from the last departure, but 
whether we have departed from the requirements 
of the statute itself. That statute does not 
exempt lots intended as building sites if the 
buildings to be erected are intended to be used 
for strictly charitable purposes, but only lots 
with the buildings thereon if said buildings are 
used for strictly charitable purposes. When, 
as here, there is neither the present ~haritable 
use nor the vestige of a building in which such 
use might be carried on, there d~pears to be no 
possible basis for exemption~ exc~pt sympathy for 
a purpose which we may regard as commendable • 
••• In deciding the El Jebel case more than 
sixteen years ago, this court took judicial notice 
of the fact that the existence of a world-wide 
depression had prevented the completion of many 
similar buildings. Today we cannot be blind to 
the fact that the property there involved, situ-
ated in close proximity to the State Capitol 
grounds, remained through many years unused for 
any purpose, the building still incomplete, the 
property exempt from taxation and the original 
intent long obscured. 
Staff Residences for Hospital 
The Tax Commission has granted exemptions for staff resi-
dences owned by a hospital and located in close proximity to the 
institution. Perhaps the reason for the exemption is that hospital 
personnel are subject to eme1gency calls and must live within a few minutes travel time of the hospital. The Supreme Court's decision 
in the Bishop and Chapter v. Treasurer of Arapahoe Countfi (1902), 
29 Colo. l43, may reflect to some degree the basis forte commis-
sion's action. In this situation, the Treasurer of Arapahoe County 
denied an exemption on real estate known as Matthews Hall, because 
the building was utilized as a residence for the bishop of the diocese. 
The exemption was claimed for educational purposes, and the school 
was conducted in Matthews Hall under the direction of the bishop. 
The Supreme Court held: 
.••• The occupation by the bishop is in con-
formity with the conditions upon which part of 
the funds used for the purchase of the ~remises 
were given. He occupies these premises in his 
official capacity as chief instructor of the 
school. In this capacity his presence resulting 
from residence is required. He is actually an 
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instructor; his object in occupying the premises 
is to discharge his duties in that capacity; 
hence his dominant purpose in residency at the 
hall is to carry out the objects of the insti-
tution, and it is this purpose which gives 
character to the use by him. 
Although the residences are not located on the grounds of 
the hospital, the commission apparently expanded the concept out-
lined in the Bishop of the Cathedral of St. John case because the 
residences are essential to the operation of the hospital. 
This same analogy also could be applied to ad valorem 
exemptions granted for staff residences of volunteer social workers, 
campus night watchman for a women's college, etc. 
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Summary of the Problem of Private Ad Valorem Exemptions 
The exemptions granted by the Tax Commission have followed 
very closely the Supreme Court's basic premise that constitutional 
and statutory provisions for ad valorem exemptions-for charitable, 
religious, and school property should be liberally interpreted. 
That is, if the property is needed in the actual conduct of a 
church program, a qualifyina educational activity, or charity, 
the property is entitled to an ad ,valorem tax exemption •. Thus,. 
although a church parking lot is not used solely and exclusively 
for religious worship, the parking lot is considered essential to 
the conduct of the affairs of the church and should be granted an 
exemption. 
The courts and the Commission also have expanded the lib-
eral rule of construction to include organizations that are self-
supporting--senior citizen homes, for example. The mere fact that 
fees, charges, or rents finance construction and maintenance of 
a piece of property is not sufficient grounds for denying an ex-
emption. In other words, a charity does not necessarily mean . 
"pauperism," or economic dependence-on private or governmental 
welfare. Assistance and comfort to the aged, regardless of their 
financial means, constitutes a charity according to numerous court 
decisions in other jurisdictions. With this in mind, it would 
appear that the charitable nature of senior citizen homes, hospitals, 
etc., is lost only when the institution derives a profit from its 
operation. · 
The Supreme Court and the Commission have considered "use•• 
of property as the critical factor in the determination of whether 
the "liberal rule" of construction should apply.· If a private in-
stitution that is entitled to an exemption owns property that is 
not in use, or from which income is derived, the courts and the 
Tax Commission have concluded that the property is not entitled to 
an exemption. 
The Issue 
Since there has been little change in the constitution and 
statutes, as they relate to private tax exemptions, members of the 
Commission, Colorado Municipal League, etc., have commented that 
the increased growth of various nonprofit enterprises, particularly 
senior citizen homes, etc., is eroding the property tax: base of lo-
cal governments, while, at the same time, adding to the burden of 
county, city, town and special district services. Whether or not 
an institution is a chari tv mav not be the real issue at_ stake. 
Rather, the question is: "At what level of government are chari-
ties, religious in.sti tutions and private schools to be supported?" 
After all, a tax exemption, as expressed by Ray Carper, Tax Commi-
ssioner, at the June 9, 1965 meeting of the committee, "is a sub-
sidy paid for by the owners of taxable property." The property ta~ 
primarily is a local government tax, and it follows that an institu-
tion deriving benefit through a subsidy at the local level actually is 
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supported by this level of government. This raises the fundamental 
question of whether local governments should bear the burden of pri-
vate exemptions. 
On the other hand, property tax relief is a simple and econ-
omical means to encourage desirable activities that may enhance the 
community and reduce the burden of government. If property tax re-
lief for senior citizens is a worthwhile endeavor, because many 
of these individuals are living on moderate fixed incomes, should 
not the exemption apply to all elderly persons? Realizing that a 
broadening of the tax exempt base will add to the probems of local 
government, the impact of these ~xemptions .to local govetnment~ 
may be reduced by alternate forms of financing. Furthermore, state 
assistance to local governmen:t: rnay be a more practical approach to 
encouraginq charitable and religious activ.it:tes than trying to de-
termine individually, by some form of direct subsidy, which acti-
vities should be encouraged and which should not. 
In summary, a review of tax exemptions not only entails a 
determination of the worthiness of an activity a'nd whether the pro-
gram needs to be encouraged financially by government action, but 
consideration needs to be given to the means for financing the gov-
ernmental subsidy as well as the level of government that is to bear 
the burden of the subsidy. 
Periodic review of the following basic questions may be help-
ful: 
1) Should the statutory definitions of educational, religious, 
and charitable purposes be made more strict? 
2) If current exemptions are to be encouraged, should local 
government bear the entire cost of the subsidy? 
3) Based on the trend of ever increasing erosion of the ad 
valorem tax base, are local governments in need of developing al-
ternative sources of revenue? 
4) Should exempt institutions pay fees in lieu of taxes or 
nonschool taxes to finance the cost of services rendered to the tax 
exempt properties? 
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